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THE MAGICAL THOUGHT-PATTERN OF THE BANTU IN RELATION TO HEALTH SERVICES

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INTRODUCTION

In view of the increasing interest in the health of Africans, it will not be inappropriate to outline some medical concepts, particularly those that are classed as superstitious or magical, of the Lovhedu of the far N. E. Transvaal. These concepts, in terms of which the Lovhedu explain and treat disease, are not peculiar to them; we found the same basic presuppositions and medico-magical thought-structure in a large number of tribes in the N. Transvaal. Moreover, when we presented them to African audiences in the Eastern Province, even in the Grahamstown locations which have been subjected to over 100 years of intensive Europeanization, we were struck by the response they evoked and the similarities in local conceptions they suggested, despite the wholly different Lovhedu terminology. It was clear that they might be regarded as fairly universal, not of course in their detailism but in the thought-pattern they exemplified.

These conceptions seem to be formulations in logical structure which conditions a great deal of reasoning and especially the so-called "magical mentality" of the Bantu. Like the conceptual scheme gradually built up by physical inquiry in our natural sciences, the presuppositions and logic of which determine observation, chains of reasoning, and verification among us, this conceptual pattern or "magical mentality" provides a framework of criteria, categories of

thought, and explanatory principles. The whole structure is considerably elaborated and often invoked in regard to health and disease, but it is, of course, of much wider application. We shall confine ourselves to its relation to one aspect of health—the use of "medicines". There are obviously many other aspects of health, such as nutrition, in relation to which it might be examined with profit. But our contention—namely, that an understanding of the pattern of the so-called "magical mentality", its recognition of causality, its essential empiricism and its applications, is very relevant to the effective execution of national health plans—will adequately emerge from a consideration of Lovhedu medicine.

We are not primarily concerned with the therapeutic value of the herbs used by the Lovhedu, though it was in our attempt to investigate this aspect that we came to understand their medico-magical thought-pattern. It is, however, important to remember that they have an extensive knowledge and make effective use, more especially, of the vegetation. This knowledge and use are based upon close observation, continuous trial and error and a real understanding of causal relations. It seems also to be interlocked with a conceptual universe that appears to be entangled in mysticism. Yet, from the point of view of the presuppositions accepted as axiomatic in the society, a coherent system results, in

which, at the level of observation and verification that obtains, it is difficult to say where science ends and magic begins.

In the Lovhedu thought-context this universe is coherent; but there is also no divergence between the empirical and the "magical". The "magical" in all its forms, including the medical, is continuous with the empirical and discontinuous with the mystical, that is, with what is considered to be different from the natural. It was, in fact, this aspect of the Lovhedu thought-pattern that puzzled us most. The Lovhedu themselves are sufficiently familiar with abstract thought to give an investigator considerable insight into their scheme of conceptual generalizations; but the real difficulty was to discover how they linked their generalizations to the facts of everyday existence, and how they combined an apparently fantastic basis of premises with a very enviable body of exact knowledge. The one seemed to be remote from reality; the other had a firm foundation in close observation and in a great deal of experimentation. The links began to appear when we studied in detail the whole medical system: the ingredients of medicines, conclusions as to how the human body functioned, causation of disease and its symptomology, methods of diagnosis, procedures in treatments or in bringing the properties of medicines to bear upon the cause of the illness. Practical experience (for we treated 5 to 20 cases daily) in using their conceptions when we administered European drugs, gave us many hints as to their outlook; it was also useful in showing how European conceptions could be made intelligible and acceptable by way of extension and elaboration, rather than contradiction and denial of the validity, of their conceptions.

It is this positive response, as contrasted with the lack of faith in European doctors, nurses and hospitals that indicates how wasteful ignorance of African conceptual categories is liable to be. Even if a doctor is justified in scorning "superstitions" or magic, he can ill afford to ignore the great mass of useful home remedies and the body of ready-made knowledge with which he can articulate his own treatments and prescriptions. In

any case, if he thinks that African medicine is largely dominated by magic, he should also realize that magic is *our*, not *their*, conception. This in itself should cause some hesitation if not misgiving in those who see only superstition in beliefs and ways of thought that differ from ours. Our submission is that a more enlightened outlook on the relation of medicine and magic is called for; and, while only a small part of the Lovhedu scheme can be presented here, its rationality is easily seen. We deliberately confine ourselves largely to the aspect of Lovhedu medicine that at first sight seems to be most irrational, namely to conceptions for which we can see no empirical basis. It should not be concluded that they have no other conceptions, some of them not differing from ours in any material particular; but the overlapping is at the level of the concrete and there is more and more divergence as one moves towards the centre or ultimate generalizations in the two conceptual structures. The one we call science, the other magic; it would, however, be more conducive to an appreciation of their similarities and differences if we could divest ourselves of any preconceptions implied in the word magic; and in practical applications it is well to realize the futility of scornfully contrasting the rationality and science of our medical practices with the irrationality and magic of the methods of the African. A prerequisite to rapid mass education is at least sufficient understanding of the basic conceptions of African medicine to articulate the two systems. This is, of course, not a plea that we should approve magic but it is a plea for a better appreciation of the presuppositions and logical structure of African medicine, with a view to securing their willing co-operation and effecting the most useful changes with a minimum of misunderstanding and a maximum of success.

THE EMPIRICAL BASIS.

Approaching our subject from its empirical basis, that most impressive body of knowledge of the vegetation, we should note that it is not merely plants and their qualities that the Lovhedu have observed, classified, and handled in this way.

But as emphasizing a scientific approach and constituting an important clue to medical conceptions, this science of the properties of plants may be taken as a suitable illustration. It is a science that brings plants into relation with many aspects of practical life, for it is at the basis of the use of fruits and roots, leaves, and soft stems as food, and other parts of plants in the handicrafts and in a variety of other economic activities as well as in medicine, ritual and religion. In all these activities one finds a pragmatic adjustment by the application of empirical knowledge. The extent to which the vegetation is exploited is impressive enough in itself, but it is the diversity of uses to which it is put and the effectiveness of such uses that makes one realize how large the background of exact knowledge is and how much it relies upon close observation, experimentation, appreciation of causal relations and appropriate application.

Perhaps it will convey a better impression of this scientific background if we mention that of 500 plants collected by us, we found that 230 formed part of the ordinary everyday medical pharmacopoeia, 200 had mainly economic uses, over 100 provided fruits and berries that were eaten either raw or after some treatment, about 45 were subjected to a process of steaming or boiling in order to serve as vegetables or relishes. A study of the details of these uses indicates even more clearly the large role played by discriminating observation and analysis, not to speak of appreciation of the relation between the properties of the plants used and the function they have to fulfil. At the technological level of the culture it is hard to conceive of a more thoroughgoing and effective exploitation. They make string, for example, from various parts of 20 of the 500 plants collected, but the plant selected and the process of preparing the part used is always related to the kind of use in view, for, different qualities of strength, thickness, durability, colour and so on are necessary in different circumstances. The labour required to prepare strings for making a net is not warranted when it is string to tie together the poles of a temporary structure that is needed. It is true that the

processes of making string are not very varied, but they are as varied as could reasonably be expected considering the tools that are available.

When one considers the attention that is given to durability, flexibility and resistance to wood-borers, of timbers; when one studies the different qualities of wood regarded as appropriate in different conditions, such as conditions of dampness and dryness; when one investigates the methods of extracting oils or converting fruits into beverages, of preserving or canning flowers and greens—to give only a few illustrations—one realizes that considerable exact knowledge is implied. It is knowledge that has been systematized in relation mainly to practical utility, as a study of the classification of plants indicates.

A great deal of this knowledge is part of the cultural heritage; but it is being added to continuously by experimentation with plants, new and old. Plants recently introduced such as the silver oak and bluegums are tried out for various purposes and accepted or rejected; new articles such as yokes, chairs and new methods of constructing huts call for further experimentation. We have seen people try out unknown roots as food owing to the scarcity of relishes, on one occasion with results that were recognized as poisoning. And the methods of testing and experimenting are not haphazard but clearly based upon estimates of the qualities of the objects used. One had merely to watch the activities of herdboys as they attempted to construct the spectacles or watches or other contrivances they saw us use, to realize to what extent experimentation is part of their values; and it certainly is an eye-opener to examine closely the ingredients of the medicines contained in a doctor's medicine bag: obviously a large number of them are new substances unknown until recently, such as salts and oxides obtained in the towns. We may not agree with the experimental pattern but we cannot but appraise the attitude it reflects.

This body of knowledge and the accompanying empirical attitude is general among all sections of the population. Boys and girls are familiar, to an extent that may well be the envy of even a botanist, with the names of plants, the methods

of obtaining glue or birdlime from them, or of using them as disinfectants or repellants, and a great variety of other properties that can be put to practical use, such as attracting bees and insects that are edible, curdling milk, mending utensils, alleviating pain, extracting deep-lying thorns, accelerating fermentation of beverages, dying materials, and so on. Even after we had realized how greatly this knowledge of the Lovhedu layman exceeded that among ourselves, we constantly encountered new evidences of it, for example, in the detailed observation implied by the fact that adults, by chewing, smelling, rubbing and tearing, identified plants merely from the stem or root or leaf presented to them. Consistent with the recognition given to trial and error is the frequency with which one encounters the naming, especially of crops, after the individual who first introduced them or first successfully cultivated them.

The great experimenters are, however, the doctors. They know a great deal more of the properties of plants than ordinary men and the quest among them for new uses is far keener. There is no doubt that, where the effects upon the human organism are obvious on the ordinary level of observation, their knowledge of physiological reactions to the plants they use as medicine is no less imposing than in other spheres. That is not unnatural, for disease is the greatest concern of the society; it is the source of most of their anxieties; and it is combated and guarded against at every step in a man's life. There is a remedy for every illness; medicines are used to supply deficiencies and to give strength to growing children; and the conception of protective vaccination is well-developed. It may be true that diagnosis, vitiated by imperfect knowledge of anatomy and physiology, is often wrong; but there is no doubt at all that Lovhedu doctors understand fully what the effects of their medicines are.

Though it is far from our purpose to show the real therapeutic value of the medicines used, it would be wrong to assume that a correct diagnosis of the cause of a disease is a necessary prerequisite to the discovery of an effective

remedy. Long before we knew about the malarial parasite, we were using quinine, a remedy borrowed from the Native peoples of America. The Lovhedu treatment of common ailments such as colds, indigestion, measles, even malaria and dysentery, is not to be sneezed at. They deal with many illnesses in ways that conform to our methods. They handle conjunctivitis, for instance, by scraping the inside of the eyelids with a rough leaf (of *Dombeya rotundifolia*) till the blood freely flows, when a soothing powder is applied, a method which, despite the good results achieved, we could not credit as of much use until to our surprise we found the same treatment used in our own hospitals with, of course, properly sterilized instruments. We could give many other examples. But until an analysis has been made of the few hundred medicines we sent to the Medical Institute, the only point we can legitimately make is that Lovhedu doctors are great experimentalists, and at all events bring the actual and observable properties of the plants they use into relation with the cause, as they diagnose it, of the disease.

THE CONCEPT OF MEDICINE AND OF ITS PROPERTIES

Much of this ready-made knowledge can undoubtedly serve as a basis for introducing more elaborate conceptions; but it is often thought that, since it is largely tainted with magic, the basis is somewhat insecure. This view of the matter seems to us to be erroneous. In the first instance, what appears to be magical to an observer judging causal relations in terms of his own pattern of observation, causation, and verification are not necessarily magical if one has regard to the attitudes and procedures of carriers of the culture. Indeed the word magic cannot be translated into khilovhedu to express any of their medical conceptions. They have no word for magic as distinct from medicine. The concrete substance in which the properties inhere is called *mulimo* (also, but more rarely, *muri*, literally plant), while the generalized abstract conception of the potency of drug is *vhuzaga* (the powers handled by the *zaga*, doctor). But *vhuzaga* does

not have a mysterious connotation like magic: it is conceived to work like any natural force and is looked upon as wholly different from the supernatural.

The Lovhedu have quite definite views on the supernatural. It is of several kinds and constitutes a pluralistic universe. At its one pole is witchcraft proper (*vhulōi vhya vhusiu*) which in its techniques and generation is utterly incomprehensible; it operates by supercausation in some miraculous manner; and it is always sinister, the quintessence of criminality. At the other pole of the supernatural is the *gōma*, a highly concentrated ritual force, more awesome than mysterious, which owes its potential to circumstances and associations rather than to the properties of medicines, and can charge objects in contact with it, or discharge its power in a way that is regarded as intelligible. But even *vhulōi vhya vhusiu* is tractable, in the sense that there are medicines which can neutralize or counteract its potency, though this is always more difficult than to cure its physical effects. The Lovhedu distinguish sharply between curing the effects, the disease, say, caused by some agency, and attacking the cause, the agency producing the effects.

This distinction and the tractability even of witchcraft are of great importance in bringing our ideas in relation to theirs, particularly since, as they phrase it, "education gives men the power of witchcraft" (meaning that by education the sinister can be made intelligible and converted into the innocuous). But our present point is that medicines and *vhuzaga* fall outside the sphere of the supernatural: they have no connotation, that, from the point of view of the thought-structure of the Lovhedu, can be said to correspond to our magical. If a Lovhedu understands something of the mechanism of a motor-car, he may say that it is driven by *vhuzaga*, the natural powers of petrol; but more usually he speaks of its motive power as *vhulōi*, meaning that brand of *vhulōi* that is rather wonderful, namely *vhulōi vhya matsiane* (day witchcraft) not *vhulōi vhya vhusiu* (night witchcraft) which is supernatural. A layman among ourselves might similarly think of electricity as wonderful, but not in the same cate-

gory as the miraculous. The distinction lies in the fact that the one functions, like medicine, by virtue of the properties of matter, but the other can produce its effects without the interposition of matter-of-fact mechanisms: in the one "medicines" are used, in the other not.

"Medicine" as used in this context has a much wider connotation than our parallel conception. Its meaning can hardly be conveyed without showing in detail its place in the total thought-structure. It will, however, be sufficient for our purposes to point to an assumption which takes us a long way towards understanding some of the reasoning connected with medicine and its use. The assumption is that in things of all kinds, plants as well as inorganic substances, there inhere specific properties or powers (*maqda*). This assumption is not unlike our own, but at the level of observation and verification of the Lovhedu the properties cover a range and extend to a sphere that, by our conceptions, transcends the purely physical. Matter at this level has either self-evidently, as a fact of observation, or as an irresistible result of influence within the thought-pattern, not merely such properties as weight or colour, but also potencies of a non-physical order. These properties are either directly perceived or deduced from their reactions, but both the perception and the deduction are conditioned by a thought-pattern which is different from ours. We should, however, always remember that basically there is the very extensive and accurate knowledge of the physical properties, especially of plants, and that practical experience is the starting point of inferences. Where medicines are applied to the human body, their properties are deduced from the more obvious reactions—the intoxication, purgation, poisoning, alleviation of pain and other effects that are produced. The sap of a euphorbia, for example, has purgative powers if administered in a suitably diluted solution; it will, however, poison the system if the dose is too large.

There is no difficulty in classifying this conception as scientific. But it is carried considerably further. Not only are properties of medicines deduced from the facts, but a logical structure has

been elaborated out of these properties. We may say that the facts are construed in terms of the theory constructed of the properties. When the properties according to our observation inhere in the medicine, we consider the use of the medicine as based on science; when, however, they appear to us to be ascribed, the use seems to be magical. But to a Lovhedu this distinction is invalid. He has no doubt ascribed, say, certain strengthening virtues to the medicine made from the backbone of the python on the analogy of its great strength, but if challenged, he always attempts to prove the potency of his medicine from the actual observed facts and reactions upon patients. The factors coming into play and producing these reactions are complex, and, unless techniques exist in the society for discriminating between them; it is impossible to show him the difference between properties that inhere in matter and properties that are merely ascribed and imaginary. Just as the drinking of the sap of a euphorbia indubitably and self-evidently causes intestinal upheavals, so, to take an extreme example, the eating of a lion's heart gives a man great courage, or the chewing of certain roots enables him to speak with confidence. These are as much facts of ordinary observation among the Lovhedu as that the administration of coloured water may effect a cure among us. It is possible with the techniques at our disposal to show that the coloured water has its effects, not because of its intrinsic virtues, but because of the forces brought into play in the circumstances; but such discrimination is impossible at the technological level of the Lovhedu and the facts can be interpreted in no other way than as confirming their hypothesis. Moreover, the interpretation is more acceptable and rational in the Lovhedu context, since it is part of a coherent logical structure: the power or property ascribed to the medicine is always similar to the actual physical properties of its ingredients, or is an irresistible deduction from similarities of this nature.

It is easy to say that the Lovhedu are guilty of the misapplication of association of ideas or that they illegitimately make use of false analogies. That may be said of much of our science, and it

ignores the difficulty that, given the equipment of the society, one cannot show that there has been this misapplication or that the analogy is false. The structure built upon properties, inherent in or ascribed to matter, is coherent, and, as far as it can be tested against objective reality by the knowledge and techniques available, the correspondence is adequate as providing a secure basis for all practical purposes. Properties, whether actual or ascribed, all operate according to the same principles which assume mechanical cause and effect. The ascription must necessarily conform to this pattern and it seems that, if analogies are frequently used, empirical relations are never ignored. Medical causation, even when it is obviously magical by our standards, does not involve contradictions. The whole scheme is the result, not of a type of reasoning,—whether we call it “magical mentality” or supernaturalism—which is different from ours, but of rational thought, subject to the limitations of observation, unaided by technical devices, and conditioned by a conceptual structure that is alternative to our own.

SOME CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES

That it is possible to arrive at many conceptual patterns, by applying logic and rational thought to the data provided by the senses, is clear from the Greek theory of humours. Hippocrates, who relied on observation and experience, nevertheless interpreted ill health in terms of the four cardinal fluids; for it was upon a theory of the proper balance between these fluids that the science of medicine was constructed. It is not to be supposed that he or the Greeks were indifferent to the questions as to whether the theory explained facts or corresponded to reality. But in the absence of microscopes, chemical analysis, serum-therapy and other methods of improvising measurement and discrimination, the inferences that can be made from the same sense data are very various, and emphasis upon the sovereignty of pure reason is intelligible. Where pure reason (checked only by observation that is unaided by any yardsticks) is relied upon, as it must be in primitive societies, the nature of the conceptual

structure will depend largely upon universally accepted premises, presuppositions that are inculcated by the cultural heritage as axiomatic. One might, therefore, expect a considerable number of conceptual orientations, patterns of abstract ideas that are invoked to explain causal relations. Though they might differ widely from one another, as patterns of value or ambition or emotional interest do, they are nevertheless, from the point of view of their reliance upon logic, their internal coherence, and their recognition of mechanical causation, not contradictory to one another, but alternative conceptual systems recognizing the same fundamental principles. It would take us too far afield to give the whole Lovhedu conceptual structure, but a few illustrations of their ultimate generalizations in the field of medicine will suffice to elucidate our meaning.

The generalizations are derived from the conception of properties inhering in or ascribed to substances of all kinds. Perhaps the concept of heat (*hu fesa*) is easiest to understand, since it makes the smallest demands upon knowledge of the cultural background in which it is embedded. Moreover, it is one of the most comprehensive generalizations, constituting a guiding principle in a kind of thermodynamics of material, mental, ritual and religious forces. "Heat" in this context affects the material potency of medicines, the physiology of persons, the mental repose of the gods, even the mystical powers of *vhulô* (witchcraft) and *digôma*, and the welfare of the whole country. "Heat" is conceived to be destructive; it reduces or destroys the effectiveness of the powers of medicines, charms and *digôma*; it causes as well as accompanies disease; it stirs the gods to anger; and it provides the condition in which the criminal propensities of witches can operate. These destructive powers that are ascribed to *hu fesa* are intelligible only against the total cultural background, particularly the antithesis between heat and the main basis of a sense of security, namely, the cooling, life-giving rain. Every major activity and arrangement in the society is directed towards the supreme end of strengthening that basis and combating any threats to it: the royal institutions, the succession

to the throne, the consecration of the queen as rain-maker and controller of half the cosmic forces, the great *gômana-vhuharera* complex of mysteries, the magico-religious structure. "Heat" and "cold" thus become all important conceptual categories which are brought into relation with the functioning of forces of a most diverse nature.

The Lovhedu do not necessarily think of *hu fesa* as a physical burning or generation of heat, but the idea of its nature is suggested by physical heat and frequently physical heat is associated with *hu fesa*. One can, of course, sense the "heat" associated with illnesses especially in fever, the most prevalent illness; but one cannot directly sense it when it arises from friction in the institutional machinery, as when the seasons are out of joint, or twins are born, or a chief dies. The results are, however, evident in droughts and dessication of the crops. In medicine the generalization plays a very large role. Many illnesses cause the blood to be "hot", the blood, as it is conceived, being the physical medium that carries the agents of disease. *Leswa* (burning) is a physiological condition resulting from abortion and it may be transmitted from the patient to another.

In all cases in which "heat" is considered to be generated, the proper treatment is the administration of "cooling" medicines, that is, substances that have properties of counteracting the "heat" or soothing the irritation. This is a principle of universal application. Wherever "heat" has been caused—by irregular burials, lightning striking a person, death of a woman in childbirth—the remedy is to secure a return to normal conditions (*hu logisa*) by "cooling" agencies. Sources of great "heat" such as persons dying of consumption, or twins, must be buried in wet soil. Ancestors have to be "cooled" and calmed by squirting water (*hu phasa*) over their graves when there is evidence that they are angry. "Cooling" counteracts that burning of the fingers that constrains witches to do evil, and charms protecting the village against witches are often called *mashôthôjô* (things causing coolness). Likewise the great medicine used to restore the

country after the disruption following the death of its ruler is called *mufugo*, from *hu fuga*, to blow upon with a cool breeze. In all these cases the active reagent in the medicines is some substance that has "cooling" properties, such as the river stones guarding the entrances to villages or built into shrines to ancestors, the succulent bulbs used in the removal of the "dirt" of death rite (*khitsila*), the great overhanging fig trees shading places dedicated to the gods, the green undigested chyme from the goat's alimentary canal that figures prominently in ritual. Examples can easily be multiplied; all we need say is that a great deal of medical ingenuity goes into the manufacture of appropriate remedies, that is, of powders and decoctions which, owing to the special "cooling" properties of their ingredients, will counteract "heat". It will in these circumstances not appear surprising that, instead of regarding fever as nature's way of curing malaria, as did our scientists until the 17th century, the Lovhedu method is to drive out the fever or "heat" by means of a concoction that causes profuse perspiration.

Some other generalizations may be briefly mentioned. *Muridi* or "shadow" is in some respects similar to a physical shadow: it is "cast" by certain conditions and falls upon or infects those upon whom it falls. But the physical concept merely gives a hint which is considerably elaborated in order to explain a contagious affection that may be harmless to its healthy carrier, yet aggravate the illness of another contacting the carrier. *Muridi* is not a real or even a spiritual shadow; it is an explanatory principle suggested by the property of material things to cast shadows, and conceived as if accompanying certain conditions that are dangerous and contagious, as an invisible counterpart which may be transmitted by a perfectly healthy intermediary host. The analogy of the ordinary shadow is evidently not slavishly projected; for to the concept of "shadow" a connotation is given that is considerably wider and more in accordance with practical experience. The evils that cast "shadows" or, as we may say, are favourable to the generation of germs that infect those whose

resistance is weakened, are ascribed to conditions such as death or the early stages of pregnancy, or to certain untoward events. Cross-roads and river crossings are also sources of shadow, but only secondarily and for the reason that the germ or "shadow" carried by unsuspecting intermediary hosts, infects these places. Places of congregation and articles frequently handled by those who have been ill or have died figure prominently in contagion, whether of "shadow" or of forces that may be said to be ritually generated.

It is to be noted that "shadow" is a concept invoked to explain a special type of contagiousness—the Lovhedu understand ordinary contagion by contact and speak also of diseases that are airborne, especially epidemics which come with the wind (*phêfo e dile*). "Shadow" is a contagion associated with evils generated by abnormalities or deviations from the normal course of nature, evils that carry or cast gloom, and are, from the point of view of the society, very real. Death and the resulting dislocations in the lives and interdependences of near relatives of the deceased cause other much wider disturbances and upset the even play of important reciprocities. Its wider repercussions and depressing effect upon those who are already weakened by illness, which are very aptly expressed in the infectiousness of "shadow", are also counteracted by the measures taken to segregate the dislocations and to prevent dissemination of "shadow". There is thus not merely an attack upon the source of the evil, by the administration of antidotes, but also isolation of "contacts" and of those who, owing to their peculiar susceptibility, might be harmed by unsuspecting carriers. For example, a sick person is quarantined by the medicated bar placed across the entrance to his hut to warn off carriers of "shadow".

The concept of *muridi* (shadow) is, of course, elaborated in a great number of directions, representing logical applications of the idea or extensions upon the basis of other presuppositions. Thus *leridi* (literally, sinister shadow) expresses the idea of the evil, or, as we may say, the germ, in its most virulent variety which injures even its healthy carrier, such as the warrior who has killed

an enemy, or the murderer. This superadded potency again is a concept that is generalized in other contexts; and in the configuration of Lovhedu logic and the forces that are operative in the society, the whole scheme is coherent and assumes a correspondence with reality that has pragmatic value. Two illustrations will suffice to indicate this correspondence. There is the concept of *hu-fula*, a force that presages and brings about misfortune. This force is connected among other things with the power of words. If, say, an old man swears at a child or scolds someone beyond what is commensurate with his offence, his words are said to *fula* misfortune. The quality of the words, ordinarily speaking, causes shame and humiliation; but if they are excessive, they have a superadded effect which to a Lovhedu is very real. Or, to take another example in which similar forces come into play, if a man has stolen property, one of the ways of dealing with the situation is to *dôba* the thief. *Dôba*-ing is a specialized "medical" treatment which is thought to cause acute pain such as itching of the thief's fingers, or some other discomfort or reaction that will expose the thief or constrain him to seek relief by taking back the stolen article, or confessing. In one case that came to our notice the owner *dôba*'d his goats in such a manner that the thief would be subject to an irresistible impulse to bleat—the goat stolen, so it was phrased, would bleat in the stomach of the thief who ate its meat. That such was actually the effect on a young man is intelligible in the light of the whole background of education and beliefs, and the methods of internalizing in the individual a sense of guilt which occasions severe mental conflicts and can be got rid of only by confession and atonement.

Mahavha is another ritual force which operates most effectively as a social sanction. It is in some of its manifestations not unlike a repressed complex; but, while the maladjustment in the frustrated individual is recognized, it is the effects including illness, upon victims of the aggrieved person that are stressed. Its incidence is restricted to interactions between close kin, such as between a man and his cattle-linked sister to whom the society has assigned great influence and who, as a

result of cultural values, is on the one hand oversensitive to slights and on the other not permitted to obtain satisfaction through the usual channels. Many other illustrations could be given, but these will suffice to show that, in the configuration of forces in the society, the correspondence between the concepts we have mentioned and reality is not as far-fetched as might appear to an observer. A relation of cause and effect which does not exist in our scheme of things is not excluded in another scheme, for it is often not the objective truth but the subjective error that is the important determining factor. It certainly is not the unwarranted words that cause misfortune, not the *khidôba* medicine that forces the culprit to confess, not the squirting of water (*hu phasa*) that cools the *mahavha*; it is the whole background of beliefs that come into play and makes these things real forces producing the effects that are ascribed to them.

One other Lovhedu concept, that of *hu khuma*, may be mentioned. It is a generalization which uses the analogy of adulteration, contamination by mixture or disjunction in order to account for physical weakening or wasting away or enfeeblement (*hu figêhêla*). The situations that give rise to *makhuma* show that the Lovhedu are here trying to handle certain kinds of dysfunction or maladjustment, to which the attributes of adulteration (dilution of vitality) and incongruous mixture (dislocation or friction in functioning) are thought to attach. Such situations include the critical transitions in the life of the individual as well as serious crises like severe illnesses. The measures taken are in the first instance preventive: the administration of strengthening medicines or inoculation to fortify the individual by anticipation, isolation and gradual adjustment to the disrupting change. Novices in the various initiations are medically treated in anticipation of their susceptibility to *khuma* when they have to re-establish contact with ordinary life after the critical change in their careers. Babies have to be "fortified" (*hu thuswa*) by inoculation at all pivotal points and in other ways before they leave the hut of confinement to enter the perilous world, so as to prevent *hu khuma*. Close kin,

whose lives must be readjusted to the change caused by a death, will suffer *makhuma* unless medically treated. *Makhuma*, the result of *khuma*'ing, is a general debility or enfeeblement, not any specific disease.

It might be instructive to illustrate from *hu khuma* a more general principle, namely the extension of the basic concepts far beyond their primary spheres. Often this extension requires the invocation of a further series of presuppositions. The logical structure is maintained, but correspondence with reality becomes a matter, not of direct observation but of circuitous reasoning. The bones of a diviner are liable to *khuma* (lose their diagnostic powers) every month. This is so because in the process of preparing the bones, they are highly sensitized and acquire human-like properties; as a result they "see their moons" every month, undergo therefore a critical change and so, unless medically treated, will *khuma*. This periodic dilution of the potency of inanimate things is much more intelligible to a European in the case of drugs, rain-charms and some of the all important medicines upon which communal welfare is thought to depend. One finds, however, the same type of dysfunction in connection with the great *digôma*, which have to be revitalized periodically: while cattle of a kraal in which there has been a death likewise *khuma* unless suitably "strengthened". It is clear that the whole scheme, which is much more complex than represented here, neither lacks logic nor does it dispense with the concept of mechanical causation.

THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECT

We have already intimated that Lovhedu doctors are experimentalists. They are continuously trying out new substances as antidotes to diseases, and their attitude and procedure in doing so are no different from that of a scientist. Preconceptions as to the causes of an illness or properties that are ascribed to drugs on some erroneous analogy do possibly limit the range of experimentation, but not to the extent that is generally supposed. There is always that overriding consideration that "man is an elephant; he does not

eat only one kind of plant," i.e., he should try many things; and indeed there is nothing more startling than the number of medicines that are tried, rejected and changed. In the sphere of medicine one seldom finds that often reported vitiation of empiricism by the supposition that the medicine has failed because of some error in formula or some adverse sinister influence. *Khizalazaga*, deception of the doctor or nullification of the properties of his medicine, has its sphere, but it is invoked in cases of witchcraft only and that very rarely. As a general rule the automatic operation of a medicine is assumed, and if it does not effect its purpose, the reason is thought not to be the intervention of some mysterious countervailing factor, but an error in diagnosis or the ineffectiveness of the medicine. The main reason for lack of faith in European doctors, medicines and health measures lies not in any idea that our remedies will fail to have their effect because of sinister magical interference, but in our supposed inability to diagnose all but the simplest diseases, and the ineffectiveness of our remedies against the true causes of disease. To the Lovhedu, we seem to handle disease mechanically, giving attention to superficialities instead of attempting to go to the real roots of the matter. It is, however, very different as soon as one shows some appreciation of their conceptual structure.

It should be remembered that, however erroneous the premises upon which a Lovhedu proceeds in his treatments, his remedial procedure is scientific. *Khilesô*, for example, is a poisoning of the system by "something caused to be eaten" by a sorcerer, (that is what the word means), which attaches itself to the oesophagus. The conception is quite erroneous, but the administration of a violent emetic to eject the *khilesô* is a perfectly scientific procedure; it is the application of ordinary empirical rules of cause and effect. In simple treatment of obvious lesions, or where on the level of ordinary observation diagnosis is straightforward, our methods and theirs are very similar. In cases of dysentery, for instance, the doctor is concerned to eliminate the "worms" represented by or causing the wormlike, blood streaked mucus plainly visible in the stools; and

he seems (judging from the results) to have succeeded very well, after considerable experiment no doubt with the properties of herbs. Where at the level of ordinary unaided observation there is an obvious external feature of a disease, efforts are always directed at combating it; either the symptom is attacked or it is related to some physiological condition, when the real cause may be attacked. But where there are serious defects in physiological knowledge or the disease has no tangible symptoms, more and more reliance is placed upon highly derived presuppositions. Correspondence with reality, as we see it, becomes more remote, though by the model of verification applied there is no lack of correspondence from the point of view of a carrier of the culture. At the level of the practice of the humble, non-divining herbalist (*zaga tshubya*) the observational and verificatory model is drawn directly from ordinary physical inquiry as to the properties of matter; propositions are verified by operations which do not depend upon such formulations as *muridi*, *hu khuma*, *hu fesa* and so on. They assume importance as part of the thought-model in validation among the real professionals, the doctors with power (*zaga*).

The professional doctor, among other things, diagnoses with the aid of the divining dice, and the properties of these dice clearly show some aspects of the thought-pattern involved. It should be realized that essentially the configurations in which the bones fall are read according to rule. The Lovhedu doctor is not in the least impressed by the marvels of X-rays, which he considers to fulfil one of the functions of his own diagnostic dice. The X-rays have, according to him, the same power of perception as his bones, and the results are read or interpreted in the same way. If, according to our scientific thought-pattern, X-rays "see" by the laws of light, according to his the bones "see" by laws which in his system of formulations are equally demonstrable. In the first instance, the bones become media of perception and acquire properties of perspicacity as a result of the special treatment they undergo, just as a piece of iron may become a magnet, i.e. acquire the property of

attracting, by, say, an electric current. The manner in which the properties are imparted involves a further set of presuppositions such as the transmissibility of the sensitivity of the cock, vulture and wild-dog to the bones. Verification of the power of penetration of the bones is inferential. It is inferred that they perceive what the eyes cannot see, not because in a post mortem the foreign body (if anything so tangible is involved) will be found where the bones indicated it would be—post mortems are as obnoxious to the Lovhedu as handling corpses was to our doctors until the 18th century—but because acting on the supposition that it is there, the remedy applied is on the whole actually successful or is believed to be successful. Validation has meaning only within a framework of formulations, and in any case the procedure of inferential verification is one which we use in testing our ultimate scientific conceptions.

It is usual to speak of Bantu medical conceptions as if they relied on a magical thought-system, the implication being that empirical inquiry is lacking, mechanical cause and effect disregarded, with objective reality given no recognition. It is quite true that in the vast mass of home remedies the observational and verification techniques are defective and inadequate, but the implications just mentioned are unjustified. They are even unwarranted in the case of the methods of the diviner, for it is not logic, empiricism, mechanical causation and correspondence with reality that are wanting; it is an observational and verification pattern, conditioning these things, that explains the differences from our scientific structure. We may call the pattern magical, but it is detailed analysis of the processes involved that is important for the effective introduction of our concepts and the mass education that should run parallel with our measures for national health.

VALUE OF LOVHEDU CONCEPTIONS

In applying any national health scheme to the Lovhedu and to Africans generally, it is dangerous to ignore not merely the available facilities and materials and the psychological and sociological forces that condition their effectiveness, but also

the framework of knowledge and the thought pattern in terms of which they assume meaning and become significant for their intended purposes. The problem here is no different from the problem of introducing any new technique or measure; and success depends to a very large extent upon factors of a sociological nature. Only a positive and intelligent, co-operative response from the African can ensure that our efforts have their maximum effects, and one of the conditions of such a response is the intelligibility of our schemes. If they are presented as scientific in contrast to the superstitiousness of African conceptions, they are liable to be resisted or circumvented or at all events to be segregated and rendered of limited value. The repercussions in cases of conflict between different thought-patterns are just as complex as in other spheres, and the process of adjustment is as important.

The need for careful investigation and analysis in order to secure the integrative incorporation into a culture of a new element, requires no argument or justification; but insufficient attention has been given to this same need when it is a question of articulating different thought patterns. In the case of health services, more particularly, there is very little, if any, appreciation of the fact that changes do not take place mechanically. It is assumed that imposition or presentation with the backing of the results achieved and the re-orientation given by the available educative and propaganda agencies is sufficient. That such an attitude has led to pathological adjustments in the social sphere is apparently not brought into relation with what might happen in the sphere of ideas. The persistence of "magical" mentality despite decades of modern education and despite the direct attack of Christianity likewise seems to have occasioned no misgivings as to our methods. No doubt, in the case of health services, our attitude is related to our contempt for African medical conceptions, and complete justification, we think, exists for their eradication. The sense of helpless insecurity that results—hardly mitigated by the minimal substitutes that we can provide, even assuming an extension of health services far beyond anticipations or the financial

resources of the country—is not a matter of much concern.

Change is, of course, inescapable; and indeed in so vital a matter as health, changes in African conceptions are desirable; but that should make us more, not less, circumspect as to the methods we employ to effect the changes. The objects should be to minimize the incidence of dislocations, to make the results integrative as rapidly as possible, and to reach the masses so that a co-operative contribution can be made by them. The condition for achieving such objects is the grafting of our schemes and conceptions upon existing knowledge and conceptions; that is the surest way of promoting that mass education, without which the best schemes must fail. It is suggested for example, that instead of relegating African medical conceptions to irrelevance, we should use them as a medium through which to inculcate modern scientific conceptions. Moreover, if, as we have reason to believe, their methods of dealing with common ailments, not to speak of many serious diseases, such as dysentery, conjunctivitis, malaria and even smallpox, either are successful or have some real therapeutic value, is there any reason for eradicating them?

We have seen many examples of treatments by European doctors fail because of lack of understanding of Lovhedu basic conceptions of causation of disease, of methods of administration or prescription, and of ingrained usages that condition applications in practice. On the other hand, we have seen how appreciation of such conceptions and usages has altered the whole situation; it may play, and we have cases in which it has played, its part even in such a sphere as selection of a suitable tribal diet acceptable to a patient who refused to take hospital food and is in danger of succumbing through lack of nourishment. We have also seen mass opposition to a treatment (in this case of smallpox) turn to mass acceptance, when the link between our and their conceptions of the nature of the preventive measures adopted was made clear.

There is no need to present any of our medical conceptions in a distorted manner. The only requirement is that they should be articulated

with the African's conceptual scheme. We think that there is sufficient common basis in the two systems, for both recognize the validity of causal relations and both are based upon the properties or powers, real or ascribed, of matter. The premises are different but, when it is realized that they are integrated with an observational and verification pattern which can be easily handled, their extension and articulation with our pattern can be systematically undertaken. Our own experience has been that parallels and similar principles, pointed out by a judicious use of existing ideas and knowledge, are readily grasped and lead to ready acceptance of, and positive responses to our methods and conceptions. The old method of mechanical imposition or explanation in terms of an unknown thought-pattern has produced only friction, resentment, circumvention and opposition. Cattle-dipping, for example is regarded as a sinister device of the European to keep down the number of cattle, for no one believes that ticks have anything to do with cattle disease; yet it is quite easy to explain that ticks, or, for that matter, mosquitoes, are carriers or intermediary hosts just as other things may be carriers of *muridi*. The conception of dysfunction is obviously useful for conveying new ideas of physiology.

Even the pattern underlying their treatment of small-pox, once it is articulated with our conceptions, may be successfully used and extended to other diseases, and more particularly to preventive measures. Like other non-recurring illnesses small-pox is dealt with upon the pattern of a transition rite (*hu éba*): the patient is isolated, cut off from ordinary life, subjected to a marginal regime with its interdictions and special foods, and finally is gradually reaggregated into normal life: moreover, a form of vaccination is practised—scarifications on forehead and wrist into which is rubbed matter from the pustules of affected persons after treatment of the matter with special powders—and whether this is to fortify by anticipation against *hu khuma* or, as they phrase it, to call the disease (*vhya*) in a mild form so as to ease the transition, an explanation of our methods in terms of their conceptions, it has most excellent results.

In general, what the Lovhedu want to know is the relation between our methods of diagnosis and their conceptions of the causation of disease, and between the measures we prescribe—as to nutrition, prevention or cure—and the source of the evil. An intelligible explanation presupposes at least some knowledge on our part of the principles of both systems. There is no need whatever to fear that old erroneous conceptions will be perpetuated, for every explanation means an extension of the basis of observation and verification and leads to new knowledge. Mass education must, of course, be carefully planned but it can never proceed upon the supposition, that there is nothing in the society with which it can be articulated or that such articulation is of no value. Hospitals, clinics, doctors, nurses and welfare officers do not carry on their work *in vacuo*; they have to rely, to an extent we hardly realize in our society, upon a background of knowledge and beliefs. But the extent to which they do depend upon such a background is emphasized when one observes the perversions in a foreign context of our prescriptions.

This is not the place to give detailed illustrations; indeed the principle is generally recognized. What is not so generally recognized is the implication that health officers of all kinds need to be equipped with a sound knowledge of Bantu conceptions. The success of their labours and particularly the contribution they can make towards the education of, and positive response from, the masses are so largely determined by such an equipment, that a strong case can be made out for a course of training in the general principles of medical anthropology and some of the details of Bantu therapy. With our limited resources, we cannot hope to extend our health services so as to reach the masses until perhaps it is too late; but we can hope to educate them and to ensure the maximum effect of the efforts that our resources permit. The main value of such a course of training would be its practical usefulness, but it should also stimulate interest in scientific research, not only into the therapeutic virtues of Bantu medicines, but also into the health of Africans and its relation to sociological factors.

STUDIES IN AFRICAN LAND TENURE

MAX GLUCKMAN

Although these two books* are entirely different in scope, their very contrast clarifies certain fundamental relations in African land tenure systems. Professor Schapera's book is the best account I know of African land as a social fact. He makes clearer, and deals more comprehensively with, a range of these problems which he previously considered from the legal angle in his *Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom*. His present work also crystallises the core of other analyses of African land tenure by various anthropologists: Wilson's *Land Rights of Individuals among the Nyakusa*, Evans-Pritchard's *The Nuer*, Richards' *Land Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia*, Dundas on the Chaga, Fortes on the Tallensi, Nadel on the Nupe, and my own on the Lozi in *Economy of the Central Barotse Plain*. Miss Green's analysis of land-holding in a small Ibo village bears out Schapera's conclusions in the organised Tswana tribes. I feel therefore that in reviewing these books I am justified in setting out the general principles of African land-holding as well as appreciating the books themselves.

I begin with the legal problem, for it affords the best starting-point. Green concludes on the Ibo: "there was nothing to suggest that any power over the land is 'vested' in a chief as it is in some parts of Africa. And the absence of this chiefly attribute and the dispersal of rights over many small groups, accord with, and emphasise, the uncentralised and unauthoritarian nature of the society." There is implied here a picture of chiefly ownership of land which is now known to be incorrect. Wilson, in the foreword to his analysis of the rights of individuals to land in the small chieftainships of Nyakusa, refers to a Privy Council decision in which it was held that if individual Ndebele had had rights in the land,

they would be "no less enforceable than rights arising under English law", but that in fact Ndebele commoners did not have such rights. The land belonged to the chief. By quoting this decision, and then analysing individual Nyakusa's rights, Wilson implied that this would apply to commoners in the highly organised Ndebele kingdom. Studies of other Bantu kingdoms show that Wilson's assumption was probably correct, and in fact in a series of later decisions in Nigerian cases this has been held to be so by the Privy Council itself.¹ There, where land was required for public purposes, the individual Africans were held to be entitled to compensation, and the chiefs only to compensation for their reversionary rights. Among the Tswana, Schapera found that if a chief expropriates a man he must give him land elsewhere. His clear analysis shows that in the highly organised Tswana, rights over land are dispersed among many individuals and small groups, just as among the Ibo. Thus if a man abandons his holding on land allocated from the chief, the land reverts to his family; if the family dies out, it reverts to his ward; if the ward moves, it reverts to the chief representing the tribe. In short, we have here a number of social personalities and groups who have rights in the land. To a lesser extent, this is true of our own land system: the state steps in ultimately if there are no heirs, and the state can expropriate (with compensation) for public purposes. Under the state, municipalities may have other rights. The Webbs' analysis of Soviet Communism shows that there the position is similar—each in the hierarchy of organisations, from the U.S.S.R. state to the individual citizen, has certain specific rights in the land. While the State, through State and collective farms, owns the land, the members of a collective farm, in

* (1) *Native Land Tenure in Bechuanaland Protectorate*. By I. Schapera, Lovedale Press. 1943. 283 pages, 10s. 6d.

(2) *Land Tenure in an Ibo Village*. By M. M. Green. Lund, Humphries. 1941. 44 quarto pages, 4s.

¹ *Sakariyawo Shobi vs. Moraimo Dakolo and others* (1930 Appeal Cases, 667).

I am indebted to Mr. E. Unsworth, Crown Counsel in Northern Rhodesia, for these references.

return for their work, have a right to share in food, surpluses, quarters, amenities, and to use a small patch of land themselves. Thus there is little individual holding of land, but every individual owns a right to share in the farms' produce.

Thus it seems clear that in all African land tenure (and probably all human land tenure) we have to consider a "cluster" of rights in any piece or produce of land used for any purpose; and the jurisprudential task is to study the rights of different individuals and groups, how these impinge on one another, their priority, etc. For a study of this kind, Schapera's work is a model which could not be bettered; not only should every anthropologist use it as a "notes and queries" guide, but it should be in the hands of every administrator dealing with land problems.

A second important aspect of land tenure law is to study the limitations on a man's exercise of his rights. This is found in both European and African law. In European law, there are such principles as the rule that a man building on his own land may not shut out his neighbour's light, that he may not use his land so as to be a nuisance to his fellows, and so on. There are similar limitations in African law, but here, in addition there are greater limitations on the individual "holder's" right to dispose of his land. Among the Tswana (and probably all Bantu tribes) a man may not sell or lease land for money but he can, with his family's and ward's consent, give it away or lend it free. The Ibo holder cannot sell or give away land, but he can pledge it for an indefinite period, or lease it for one season. However, these limitations do not mean that African law is based on fundamentally different concepts from European law: the recent Pegging Bill in the Union is an illustration of a similar encroachment on the right of individuals to buy and sell land. And under the English law of entail, a man could impose restrictions on his heirs.

Past difficulties in recording African land tenure law have arisen from the use of terms. It is easy to translate what the African literally says, but this, no more than an average European's statements, covers the law. Everyday terms are ambiguous. Thus Green says that Ibo often

speak of a woman "owning a farm", but women cannot "own" land. However, she shows that where this is said of a woman, it covers the particular rights which a woman has in a field, rights which may be transmissible through her. If she is one of several wives of the landholder, her own sons have a right to that field as against their half-brothers by their father's other wives. This is true, too, e.g. of Tswana, Zulu, Pondo and presumably most patrilineal, polygynous people. Lawyers then object to the term "ownership"—for the chief too has rights in the land—being applied here, and anthropologists have sought for more neutral terms. At one time "usufruct" was commonly used: indeed, Schapera used it in his *Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom*. I notice he has dropped it in this book, and contents himself with analysing the rights of various persons, including Government and the chief, to the land. In short, he adopts the simple and wise procedure of saying that "*X* has or owns such and such rights in the land", instead of "*X* owns the land."

For some years sociologists have been reacting against early travellers and administrators who talked loosely of the chief owning the land, communal ownership of grazing land, and so on. Further, sociologists have objected to lawyers who try to sum up the complicated systems of African land-holding in European legal terminology. They have done so partly on the ground that lawyers consider only the legal implications of any institution, and not its full sociological background. The answer to this is that the lawyer knows it: Tribonian in his Introduction to Justinian's Institutes, specifically states that he is confining himself to legally enforceable rules, and is not concerned with the sociology of law. A series of penetrating decisions by courts in Native cases answers those foolishly vain anthropologists who consider that the lawyer cannot grasp the principles of a system of law which is different from European law. Schapera's present work, like his *Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom*, shows that European and African legal concepts can be reduced to the same terms, though they are set in different patterns, and that

the sociologist can use the work of jurists most fruitfully. I consider that the time has come when a sociologist and a jurist could combine to write on the basic principles of African law.¹

I do not here imply that this ends the sociologist's work: he has to show why the "clusters" of rights vary between one society and another with different economies and social organisations. To this point I shall return later; here I shall try to show the advantages of the formulation "X has such and such rights in piece of land y."

Let us apply this to the chief's "trusteeship" of the land for his tribe. Thus Schapera says: "Theoretically, all game belongs to the Chief in trust for the tribe and, as titular owner of the land, he is entitled to share in the proceeds of every hunting expedition." Similarly, the Lozi Paramount Chief is "owner of the country" and therefore was said to have a right to tribute of all the fruits of the country. In a similar idiom, we might say that the modern state "owns" all sources of income within it, and as such is entitled to a percentage of that income. But even in Soviet Russia, where the state's ownership is much wider than in capitalist countries, the rights of state and producing-units are strictly defined. For, all the Tswana and Barotse imply by saying the chief is owner of the country, is that he has the following rights in an individual's land: he is the residuary owner; he has a right to share in the produce, and so on. Indeed, Schapera states that the Chief has these rights *ex officio*, and not as an individual, and that he can only use tribute in customary ways. This is true of the Lozi.

The point is clarified when one considers the difference between the Chief's rights as "owner of the country" and as owner of certain fields specifically his own. Schapera discusses these clearly, and adds a new war-time difference, arising from the institution of communally worked "war-lands". The Lozi Paramount Chief owns certain fields and fishing-sites: he employs men to work them and the produce is his own, with certain customarily enjoined payments

(which he cannot avoid) to his workers or the fishermen. When his shallow pans are communally stabbed in the dry season, he takes a fixed share of every stabber's catch, like any pan-owner. When he employs men to work his nets or fish-dams, he and they take the catch on alternate days, like any commoner owner and his "employees." In land attached to the names of his councillors, he has other rights: and his rights in the ordinary commoner's land are weaker. Still, he has these rights: thus a pan-owner must give the chief a share of the fish he has taxed from the stabbers. The chief has rights to lion skins and other "royal property". But he can only exercise these rights with due regard to the rights of others, and his own courts will enforce this. Thus, all Barotse are entitled to fish with nets in public waters. In 1942, certain people said that the councillor in charge of fishing had told them that the Paramount Chief was dividing the river, and some reaches would be fished only by his men. It was not true that the councillor had said so, but while the rumour was current everyone said that the Chief would not (could not?) do this.

There is an important aspect of these rights to land which is frequently overlooked, but here it is once and for all settled by Schapera. The stress has always been on the "ownership of the chief as trustee for the tribe", and it tends to be forgotten that every subject of the chief has a right to *some* land; i.e. the chief must see that he is given places where he can build and make his gardens, and that he be allowed to graze his cattle.

In U.S.S.R. communal ownership of land the individual has only the right to use for himself his house and a small area of land, but he has the more important right, in return for the duty of working, to share in the use of Government tractors and in the produce of the State and collective farms.

I consider the right of every subject to some land to be the essence of African communal ownership of land, and I shall refer to it again below in citing Schapera's analysis of Tswana grazing. In effect, it means that as soon as pressure on land becomes severe, this right of the subject tends to become a right to any unused land, and

¹ E. Unsworth, is making a related study of the conflict of English and African law which the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute hopes to publish soon.

it can be enforced by the chief's right to expropriate others. Among the Tswana, Kgatla, Maletle, and Tlokwa, the chief asks, but cannot compel, an owner to give up land, which he is not using, for landless people, but among the Ngwato and Ngwaketse he can take this land. This is a modern development, but it is based on old rights and Schapera proposes that it be extended on the Basutoland principle (where every man is limited to three fields) in those areas where there is said to be not enough land to satisfy all. However, the same principle shows in the rule that if a chief takes away a man's land for public purposes, he must give him other land. A similar principle is shown in the following incident in Loziland in 1942. Certain men accused the fishing induna, who was buying nets for the Chief, of saying to a netmaker making a net to the order of a fisherman, that if he did not sell the Chief the net, the Chief would forbid the netmaker to use barks for fishnets, and the fisher to fish in public waters. This was taken by everyone to be a heinous statement, libelling the Paramount Chief: they said these bans could only be applied where a man was banished. Otherwise, all Barotse subjects have the right to use vegetable products, and to fish anywhere save in privately owned sites.

People own not material things themselves, but rights over these things, and in African law many people have rights in a single object. It is therefore necessary to analyse these rights and avoid using the term "ownership of the thing". In Green's book on the Ibo, the ownership of trees is a good illustration. Wherever she discusses the complicated problem in terms of "rights to cut palm-nuts" her analysis is clear: as soon as she introduces the terms "ownership of trees, communal and private", it becomes difficult to follow. Fortunately, she does this only in her summing-up. However, her work here may be contrasted with Schapera's analysis of "Tswana communal ownership of grazing-land." He shows that though this is the theory, customary grazing by a man in a certain area gives him the right to use the grazing there, and there are specially appointed tribal authorities to see that these rights are protected, legally and economi-

cally. Thus, the Chief decides that a grazing area round certain water (for water is the Tswana problem) can carry so many cattle, and he will prevent more cattle being placed in it. Owners of cattle-posts in the area may object to strangers coming in, the Chief being the arbitrator. "Although there are no individual holdings of grazing land itself, each man generally has a special site for his cattle-post, and others must refrain from placing theirs too close to him" (p. 229). That is, a man has no rights of ownership in grazing-land, but he has the right to graze his cattle in a certain place, and the courts will protect this right against trespassers. But these rights are limited in at least two ways: (1) cattle on trek may graze there, and (2) in drought, "cattle from different (grazing) districts are allowed to mix and graze together in the vicinity of such permanent waters as are available."

The position is similar among the Zulu.¹ No one can own grazing, but people get customary rights to graze their cattle in a certain place. I was told, though I recorded no actual cases, that a man could not sue a stranger who brought a herd on to his favourite pastures, but if a fight arose, the intruder would be punished by the courts for conduct causing a fight whoever was the aggressor—an indirect way of enforcing grazing-rights. Not even the Barotse Paramount Chief can allocate grazing-land to himself, though he has rights to the first use of certain grazing when the cattle return to the Zambezi Plain at the fall of the floods. Otherwise, customary grazing near a man's cattle-post or homestead gives him the right to protest against the entry of strangers. However, in both these countries, as among the Tswana, anyone's cattle can graze on others' reaped fields.

Schapera proceeds to show that in Bechuana-land, where water, not pasture, is the problem, if a man sinks a well he gets strongly-protected rights to the neighbouring grazing. However, first he must get permission from the grazing-area overseer to sink a well at a particular site and

¹ My Zulu work was financed by the South African Bureau of Educational and Social Research; my Lozi work by the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

this permission is only given with his neighbours' agreement. If he does not get permission, his well can be expropriated by the overseer. Once he has that permission, he owns the well and its water. Schapera even records the sale and lease of wells among two of the Tswana tribes; the Ngwato specifically forbid it. But in all these tribes, people can use the water only with the permission of the owner, and in some tribes the owner can sell water, though this is a recent development. However, it is a crime to charge wayfarers who water their cattle. According to one chief, the right of ownership is further limited since the well can be confiscated without compensation for the public good.

In Schapera's analysis of rights to residential, arable, and grazing land, this approach through ownership of rights is used to illuminate the whole of Tswana land tenure: for he shows clearly how rights to use land for various purposes vary greatly. A man can freely acquire, by loan or gift, arable land at some distance from his main fields; but he must have the chief's permission to change his residence. A man is not allowed, except at specific seasons, to reside at his arable land or near his cattle-posts. Permanent change of residence must be accompanied by change of political affiliation; mere change of gardens or grazing grounds does not entail changing to another political group within the tribe.

In conclusion on this point, let us examine the position among a people with vast areas of land, like the Bemba. In a review of Richards' *Land Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia*, Mrs. Hoernlé summed up: "The system of complete security under a system of land tenure where there is no ownership of land, yet where a subject, who has fulfilled his duties to his headman and his chief, chooses his gardens and tills them in complete confidence, is worthy of study by all who think that a system of individual ownership is the panacea for all the ills of tribal Africa" (*Bantu Studies*, March, 1940). A few combined quotations from Richards' book make this clear: "The statement that 'all the land is mine' does not mean that the ruler has the right to take any

piece of ground he chooses for his own use I have never heard of a case where a chief took land that had already been occupied by a commoner. It would not have paid him to do so On the other hand it is impossible for a Bemba to cultivate in a chief's territory without the latter's permission. Bemba rights to the use of land are part of a reciprocal series of obligations between subject and chief. The former accepts the political status of subject and membership of a village group. He gives respect, labour, and tribute to his chief, and in return he is able to cultivate as much land as he pleases and to occupy it for as long as he needs. The latter prays to the tribal spirits in order to make the land productive, initiates economic effort, feeds the hungry, and maintains his court and tribal councillors—all that Bemba mean by saying that he is 'working' his land" (Chapter XIII). For among the Bemba, with their sparse population scattered over a great area of cultivable bush, what all subjects own is the right to make gardens in an area of bush pointed out to heads of their villages and the subsequent right to be protected against trespassers. However, various rights in particular fishing-sites are specifically owned (Richards, p. 339), so that where a type of land is scarce, the Bemba move to recognise rights of ownership in a particular piece of land. If it is true that with the absence of men at labour-centres, villages are moving to the better land, we may see this principle more widely extended.

Thus we may sum up by repeating that the study of African land tenure law consists in analysing the cluster of rights of social personalities and groups in types of land used for specific purposes, and I repeat again that as a model for such a study, Schapera's work cannot be bettered. However, the sociologist goes beyond this legal study. If we agree that the structure of African land-tenure law is as set out above, our next task is to show why in any tribe the cluster of rights in land is of a particular pattern, and the answer lies in relating the pattern to the tribe's mode of production and social structure. Here again, Schapera's book is a model for such a study.

He begins by analysing each of the uses to

which land is put, and shows how these give rise to specific rights in types of land. At the same time he describes Tswana social structure to show how its component parts—groups and persons—are based on the land, and have rights in the land. He makes clear that it is only in such an analysis that concepts like “the chief’s trusteeship of land,” “communal grazing,” “free hunting,” etc., acquire meaning. Thus, one of the main differences between our society and African society, is that theirs is based on an extended system of kinship groups and relationships; and the fiction of kinship is carried into political groupings. Therefore, while in Europe we have individual ownership of land, with free right of disposal, in Africa kinship groups as wholes and particular kinspeople have specific rights in a man’s “holdings.” At the least, these rights appear in the obligation on the holder to consult his fellows before disposing of land by gift or loan. More than this, these rights limit markedly a man’s control over his holdings. Thus, once a man has allotted land to one wife, he cannot take it from her against her will to give to her co-wife—not without giving her grounds for divorce. Nor can he place the son of another wife on her land, nor on her death take it from her children to give to the children of another “house”. Wilson sums up thus (*Nyakusa Land Rights*): “Land is not owned in any absolute sense either by the man and his household who live on it and cultivate it, or by the village group, or by the chief, but by all of them together. Land tenure among the Nyakusa is a coherent system of rights in which the chief as overlord, the age-village under the leadership of its great commoner, the individual male holder, his wives and children all participate. In this the Nyakusa are in no way peculiar, for ‘absolute ownership’ of land is a fiction nowhere realized; even in Western Europe the use of land is hedged by state and municipal regulations while the security of every owner’s tenure is dependent upon political conditions which are not necessarily permanent. Everywhere, whether in civilised or in primitive society, the holding of land is ‘communal’ in the sense that the individual’s

rights are dependent upon his social relationships, upon his membership of some group with a definite cultural idiom and social organization of its own; everywhere the holding of land is ‘individual’ in the sense that particular people have, at any one moment, definite rights to participate in the use and to share the produce of a particular piece of ground.”

Then, in Europe, no less than in Africa, the sociologists’ task is to describe the rights of each person and group in a piece of land, and ultimately to correlate certain types of land tenure with corresponding types of social structure. For it must not be forgotten that the relationship is two-sided: each social unit has rights in land and the rights in land constitute part of the inter-relationships of social units; if rights in land are owned in terms of social structure, it is the mode of use of land which is one of the factors which produces a certain type of social structure. Evans-Pritchard has analysed this relation for Nuer and Anuak, I have done so for the Lozi, and there are many other studies of this kind. In his latest book, Schapera extends our knowledge of this relation among the Tswana, but chiefly from the point of view of land-holding, since that is his present concern. I look forward to his full study of the effects on Tswana social organisation of the movement between the Native-towns, the gardens and the cattle-posts. What he gives here, promises rich material. Thus the sociological study of land-tenure comes full circle: from an analysis of the system of legal rights in land, based on social relationships and the manner of use of land, to a study of social relationships between people who live on land which they use in a certain way.

What is significant in Schapera’s and in Green’s as in previous studies, is the great flexibility of these patterns of rights in a piece of ground. Schapera shows how these have been adjusted by the Rolong on the farms they hold individually by “certificates of occupation”. Green says of the Ibo: “A marked feature of the land situation is its flexibility, by which is meant the ease with which land passes temporarily from hand to hand. It does not change ownership but it can

be, and frequently is, obtained on a short term lease for a farming season or on pledge for an unspecified period. This is clearly of importance in easing the pressure on land of densely populated areas in those cases where more sparsely populated areas are near by." Thus, land can be exchanged, though its sale and donation outside the group is forbidden. African land-tenure law thus can adjust itself to scarcity, as we have seen Bemba law does for fishing sites.

It also contains, according to Schapera, a number of principles which we have in our own system of law and which can be used to deal with new problems. For example, if a man *A* sees *B* innocently planting in his (*A*'s) land, and stands by watching, *A* is estopped from claiming the growing crops to which he is entitled if *B* was in the wrong. Similarly, among the Lozi a man is punished if he does not drain his marshy gardens so that his neighbours' land is spoilt; he can even be expropriated. One important and most valuable part of Schapera's book is his discussion of the reaction of Tswana land tenure to modern conditions, the extent to which it can be adjusted satisfactorily, and where it is a brake on progress.

The above reflections are based on my reading of the two books under review, after comparing them with the others cited. I shall now briefly evaluate these books themselves.

Schapera's is a full and comprehensive analysis of all the social aspects of land in nearly all the Tswana tribes of Bechuanaland. It ranks as his best work, which is high praise indeed. The book is distinguished, like all his writings, by clarity, astringent relevance, and such completeness that every query which occurs to the reader is somewhere answered. While I am discussing his technique of writing, I must commend his habit of placing cases, documents, and statistics, which are too full of local details to interest the general reader, in appendices at the end of each chapter. Thus, while this data is available readily to the Bechuanaland Administration for whom the book was written, the argument is not interrupted by a mass of detail. On the other hand, Schapera has included in the text a large number of other cases and statistics through

which his analysis expresses itself. He has given various kinds of statistics by a simple, comparative method, so that they appear as the analysis itself, and not a mere documentation of figures to give an air of verisimilitude and mensuration to his work.

As in his previous work, Schapera here deals with the past and present: the Administration figures in social organization with rights to land on equal scientific terms with the chief. His procedure of describing first the modern title of the tribes to their land is eminently sound.

He considers land as the source of products and includes the products of the land as part of the land. This leads him to begin with an analysis of the economic background of land: the uses to which it was and is put, and its potentialities for development. Second, he describes the social background: the types of settlement and the groups in them (including the modern Central Government). Third, there is a chapter on the general features of Tswana land tenure: the legal status of the reserves, the position of the chief, and group and individual rights to land. Fourth, he discusses changes in the actual groups within the more or less fixed social structure, and the location of these groups on the surface of the land. These introductory chapters are followed by a series of chapters analysing all aspects of the Tswana use of land for residence, agriculture, animal husbandry, and hunting, and the use of other natural resources. The land is treated from every possible angle: the economic, the social, the legal, the ritual, etc. It is a model for the study of land tenure anywhere: and it is very good reading. My constant reference to it above will show that though it is work done for the administrator, it is invaluable to the sociologist and jurist.

Green's short paper on the Ibo in effect presents a clear analysis of her notes on agricultural land-holding, -pledging and -leasing, and use, in a small Ibo village. Since the author's aim in publishing was limited ("my reason for collecting together my notes on such a small area is that generalisations about things Ibo is impossible until facts have been collected from a sufficient

number of separate localities" to be compared with one another), criticism is necessarily limited. The field covered is well described, the generalisations and comparisons are clearly set out. There is a good analysis of the various rights which people have in a particular 'farm' and the trees growing on it, as individuals,—owners, pledgee and pledgor, tenant and landlord, residuary heirs, and women with usufructuary rights—, and as members of various groups. At times these respective rights are not clearly defined, and I gather that this is characteristic of Ibo law.

Short though it is, it is not a slight study, and it is well worth reading. However, I must note one deficiency even within its limited scope.

The analysis should refer more fully to residential rights, since rights to buildings on leased and pledged land are discussed. There is no reference to water rights, nor properly to grazing rights. These again are obliquely referred to, since we are told that cows and goats frequently destroy crops, which leads to quarrels, and that these stock have to be staked in the yam-growing season but otherwise may graze in growing crops (e.g. the newly-introduced cassava). Since the subject is introduced in relation to agricultural holdings, it would have been interesting to have had more notes on the availability of other grazing than crops, and the rights to use this, especially on rights to graze stock in others' fields.

SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING LANGUAGES OF THE SOTHO GROUP

G. P. LESTRADE

In the present article it is proposed to list the main publications which deal with one or other of the languages of the Sotho group from a linguistic point of view, whether written in one of these languages or not, and which have appeared during the years 1940-43; and brief reviews will also be given of such of these publications as have not already been reviewed in this journal, or in its predecessor, *Bantu Studies*. At a later stage, *African Studies* hopes to publish a companion article on similar lines, in which publications of a non-linguistic nature in one or other of these languages will be treated in the same way.

In the *Tswana* field, two publications have to be listed:

- (1) I. Schapera and D. F. v. d. Merwe: *Notes on the noun-classes of some Bantu languages of Ngamiland* (University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, 1942. 103 pp., roneoed.)
- (2) D. F. v. d. Merwe and I. Schapera: *A comparative study of Kgalagadi, Kwená, and other Sotho dialects* (University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, 1943. 119 pp., roneoed.)

Both of these have been reviewed (by C. M. Doke) in *African Studies*, the first in Vol. I, p. 299, the second in Vol. II, pp. 218-9.

In the *Southern Sotho* field also, two publications have to be listed:

- (1) B. I. C. van Eeden: *Inleiding tot die studie van Suid-Sotho* (Pro Ecclesia-Drukkery, Stellenbosch, 1941. 382 pp.)
- (2) B. I. C. van Eeden: *Praktiese Suid-Sotho-Lesse* (C.S.V.-Boekhandel, Stellenbosch, 1943. 70 pp., roneoed.)

The first of these has been reviewed (by C. M. Doke) in *Bantu Studies*, Vol. XV, p. 198.

Prof. van Eeden's *Lesse* form a companion to his *Inleiding*, upon which they are based. The work consists, first, of thirty-six "lessons," and, second, of a Southern Sotho-Afrikaans vocabulary arranged under thirteen main headings. The

first thirty-two lessons correspond respectively to the evenly-numbered chapters of the *Inleiding*, the last four lessons less regularly to the remaining eight chapters. The first lesson consists of notes on Southern Sotho phonetics, together with some exercises thereon. The other lessons each contain a short Southern Sotho-Afrikaans vocabulary, some grammatical notes, and some two-way translation exercises. The words appearing in the vocabulary which forms the second part of the book appear to be only those scattered throughout the vocabularies in the lessons; but here we find the greater part of them together, arranged under grammatical categories. In his preface, Prof. van Eeden tells us that he wishes the work to be regarded not only as a handbook with practical exercises and fairly extensive vocabularies, but also as a necessary supplement to the *Inleiding*.

The amount of time and trouble involved in the preparation of a work of this kind is, on the one hand, very considerable, and, on the other, apt to be but little apparent in the result, unspectacular as that usually is. Prof. van Eeden and his collaborators, Mr. Mangoela and Dr. Language, deserve every credit on that score. The phonetic, phonological, morphological, syntactical and lexicological facts presented are of a high degree of accuracy. The nature and amount of material given are also, in the reviewer's opinion, adequate to the aim of the book: a student who works conscientiously through the lessons, acquiring the vocabulary as he goes, and constantly referring to the *Inleiding*, will at the end have obtained a very useful acquaintance with the language. The first of Prof. van Eeden's twin aims has therefore without question been attained. The only doubt that arises in the reviewer's mind is whether the amount of time and trouble involved could not have been lessened, or, alternatively, whether it could not have secured even better results, if somewhat different methods had been employed

in certain respects. Much of the first lesson, and many of the notes in the other lessons, are repetitions or but slightly varied re-statements of the corresponding material in the *Inleiding*; and since the latter is constantly referred to anyway, it is difficult to see why mere references to it for most of the material in the notes could not have been substituted for the bulk of the notes themselves, on the lines of the method followed in Doke and Grant's *Zulu Exercises*. This would have saved time, trouble, and space, all of which might perhaps have been devoted to increasing the amount of translation-exercise material. Of this there can hardly be too much in a practical manual: but in this work there is sometimes hardly enough of it, especially in the earlier lessons, where it would seem to be most needed. Again, the main if not the only justification for repeating the words, scattered throughout the several vocabularies in the lessons, in the consolidated vocabulary at the end must be to give the student who is working out the translation-exercises in, say, lesson 14, and who there meets a word which has been given him in, say, lesson 8, but about which he is for the moment uncertain or at a loss, an opportunity of refreshing his memory by an easier and quicker way than either turning back to the vocabularies in all the previous lessons or wandering into the mazes of a full dictionary. But then it is in the first place difficult to see why only a one-way vocabulary is given; since the translation-exercises are two-way; and it is in the second place debatable whether classification of the words in the vocabulary according to grammatical categories has any advantages which outweigh the disadvantages attaching to the abandonment of classification according to alphabetical order. A further weak point of the consolidated vocabulary is that, under no less than eight out of the thirteen headings, the words or stems which might be included thereunder are not given, but only the references to the lesson in the *Lesse* and/or the chapter in the *Inleiding* in which they may be found. Guiding the student to his immediate aim by this roundabout route will, one fears, temporarily baffle and cumulatively irritate him.

It is, however, not merely in providing vocabularies and translation-exercises that the *Lesse* are a supplement to the *Inleiding*. The later work contains new material of two kinds not found in the earlier one. One of these is in respect of the orthography and word-division employed. By the use of diacritics and hyphens respectively, the customary spelling and word-division of Southern Sotho are adapted to show firstly the various values attaching to the symbols *e* and *o*, and secondly the real "words" of the language in the light of the grammatical point of view adopted by the author. Neither device is new, and the former has already been applied to Southern Sotho in the Jacottet-Doke *Grammar*. The latter device, however, though it has been employed for Shona in O'Neill's *Grammar*, has not yet been used in Southern Sotho; and the consistent application of both devices to this language will prove a most useful aid to the learner. The other new material is in some of the notes, where we find some aspects of morphology and syntax treated which are not dealt with in the *Inleiding* or elsewhere; and though one regrets that this new material, where it occurs, is not distinguished from what is, admittedly, not new, one is nevertheless glad to have it. In this way, then, Prof. van Eeden's claim that the *Lesse* form a supplement to the *Inleiding* is also substantiated, and the book may be said to form a welcome addition to the literature upon Southern Sotho in general, and in Afrikaans in particular.

In the *Northern Sotho* field, there are five publications:

- (1) T. J. Kriel: *Sotho-Afrikaanse Woordeboek* (van Schaik, Pretoria, 1942. 219 pp.)
- (2) P. E. Schwellnus: *Kima le Kxaló le Mešitó ya Dirétó* (Nasionale Pers, 1942. 84 pp.)
- (3) Teachers of Pax College: *Kxaša-Peu I* (Nasionale Pers, 1940. 194 pp.)
- (4) M. J. S. Madiba: *Thutó ya Poléló* (Union Booksellers, Pretoria, 1941. 93 pp.)
- (5) H. J. van Zyl: *Thika-Poléló* (Unie-Boekhandel, Pretoria, 1941. 149 pp.)

Mr. Kriel's dictionary, we learn from the preface, was "compiled to meet the great need which exists especially in Native schools." A Northern

Sotho-Afrikaans dictionary of the size of this one is certainly a *desideratum*. The only other thing of the kind published so far is T. M. H. Endemann's modest *Woordelys*, which, though useful in some respects, is too small. The present work contains, on a rough estimate, something like 10,000 Northern Sotho items—radical, derivative, and illustrative—with their Afrikaans rendering, including not only single words, but also phrases, idioms, and proverbs, illustrating the uses of such words. In addition to words and expressions which can be presumed to have existed in the language before contact with Europeans, the book contains many words common in Northern Sotho to-day, but which owe their origin to that contact, whether they are actual borrowings from a European language or new coinages utilising Bantu elements only. In this way, the book contains a fair amount not found even in K. Endemann's great *Wörterbuch*. As sources, Mr. Kriel tells us, he has used his classes (at the Bothšabélô Training College), Sotho readers, texts, and periodicals. The spelling is that now officially recognized by the appropriate authoritative bodies. Certain intonation-signs have been used in cases where they have critical significance. The Pedi dialect has been taken as the standard, but words, and formal and semantic variants, have been included from other dialects in a number of cases. The book, then, is not only timely, but also full of meat; and Mr. Kriel deserves considerable credit, not only for his initiative, but also for the considerable amount of time and labour that must have gone into the work.

It is safe to assert that there are considerably more Northern Sotho-speakers learning Afrikaans than there are Afrikaans-speakers learning Northern Sotho; and it is accordingly not surprising that, as Mr. Kriel indicates, the need for a Sotho-Afrikaans dictionary should be greatest among Sotho-speakers. Now a Sotho-Afrikaans dictionary for the Sotho-speaker will have to be something pretty different from a Sotho-Afrikaans dictionary for the Afrikaans-speaker, and neither book can take the place of the other except as a *pis aller*. The orientation of Mr. Kriel's work is

however, preponderantly from the Afrikaans-speaker's point of view; and so it can serve the needs of the Sotho-speaker as a temporary stopgap only, until a Sotho-Afrikaans dictionary compiled from the Sotho-speaker's angle is issued. Perhaps Mr. Kriel will do that one day.

It is, therefore, fairest to the book to consider it as if it were intended only for the Afrikaans-speaker; and to judge it in that light, and bearing in mind its, after all, comparatively small dimensions, what has been included, and how that has been arranged, illustrated, and, in context and out of it, interpreted.

With the amount of material offered the reviewer has little or no quarrel. But the same amount could, one feels, have been included in less space, and, moreover, presented more usefully, if certain lexicographical devices in common use had been employed, and if the arrangement and presentation of the items had a more consistently Bantu basis. Thus in listing derivatives after the radical with which they are connected, the use of some kind of ditto-symbol to represent the radical or that part of it which is found unchanged in the derivatives would not only have saved space, but would also have shown more graphically the relationships between the radical and its derivatives, and of the derivatives among themselves. Again, words connected with the same radical should have been grouped together: it is a little disturbing to find e.g. *-fókóla*, *-fokodiša* and *fokotša* separated from each other, though fortunately close neighbours; and even more disturbing to find *bofokodi*, *mofokólô*, and *mofokodi* widely separated from the parent verb, and the last two nouns far removed from the first one. Since indexing under the first letter of the stem was adopted in the case of verbs, the same should have been done consistently for nouns, with cross-references under the initial letter of the prefix only in certain cases where necessary.

The illustration of the uses of the items listed might perhaps have been done more judiciously. Space does not allow the author to do it for every item, nor is that necessary, but the items for which it is done should be all the more carefully selected. We find here proportionately rather

many cases where we could have done without a given illustration, which could have made room for a more necessary one. Thus there is little need for *kxomo e amuša namane*, fully translated, after we have been given *amuša* and its meaning: but we would have liked to see *balla* used, which Mr. Kriel renders *wurg aan kos*.

The author attains a fair degree of success in the interpretation of the items listed: but the number of cases where the interpretation is open to objection is not inconsiderable, and though the inaccuracies may be individually venial in some of the instances, their effect is cumulatively disturbing, and makes one wish that greater care had been exercised as regards this aspect of the book. Thus, to name but very few examples out of really rather too many that could be given, *hoeveelheid* is not an accurate translation of *bongata* (for which *menigvuldigheid* or *veelvuldigheid* would be nearer), though it might, in one sense, render *bokae?* (not given, incidentally, common as the word is, though the stem *-kae?* is listed), and, in another, *bokalô* (of which the only translation given is the eccentric *rentekoers*). *Oupa en kie* (*sic!*) is neither correct nor suitable nor idiomatic as a translation of *bô-ntate-moxolo*: *oupa-hulle* is, incomprehensibly, overlooked. *Die status van 'n skaap* is surely an odd translation of *bonku*: *aard* or something of the kind should have replaced *status*. It is difficult to see why *borwa* with a small initial should have been rendered *suid*, *suide*, and the same word with a capital initial rendered *Boesmangerwoonte*; and why *baabi* should be given as *kommissariaat*, with no reference to the meanings *verdelers*, *uitdelers*, correctly enough given under the singular *moabi*. This type of fault is fairly easily avoidable; and except for that, the interpretation is competent, and worthy of being relied upon by the many who will be only too glad to avail themselves of the book's help.

The importance of Dr. Schwellnus' volume is threefold. He has presented, in most readable and instructive form, a considerable body of information concerning certain aspects of Northern Sotho phonesis which are not too easy nor very generally studied. He has included therein a

considerable proportion of material constituting new and important contributions to the several fields covered. Finally, he has done all this through the medium of the language concerned, which, rich and flexible enough in the hands of such a master of it, had yet to be adapted by him in not a few instances to the new tasks he laid upon it.

The book consists of three sections of unequal length, dealing respectively with Length and Stress, with Intonation, and with Prosody.¹ In each section we are given a number of observations on the nature of relevant phenomena in the language, illustrated with a variety of appropriate examples. Among the latter we find, in the section on Prosody, specimens of the author's own composition, including impressive renderings of Psalm 90 and of 1 Corinthians 13.

It is in any case an achievement of no mean merit to have conveyed so much information of a rather abstruse nature in such simple form. When, however, in addition, the vehicle is the speech of a people without the necessary background of scientific or literary tradition, and when, in consequence, the indispensable technical terminology has for the most part to be either freshly adapted or newly coined outright as one goes along, the nature of the achievement becomes all the more remarkable. In this connection it may be hazarded that Dr. Schwellnus' adaptation of existing terms, and his construction of new ones, the felicity of so much of which evidences the author's wide command and intimate sense of Northern Sotho, may prove to be not the least of his many and valued contributions to the growth of the language.

As to the material presented, this is, though not all new, yet all apparently based upon the author's own observation, with little reference to the work of others who may have contributed to one or other of the fields covered. In a semi-popular work of this nature, detailed reference to and/or

¹ The Sotho title of the book does not mention that Length (*Kišô*) is dealt with as well as Stress (*Kima*). The English sub-title unfortunately uses the unsatisfactory term *Accent* to render the *Kima* of the Sotho title; and renders *Mešitô ya Dirêtô* misleadingly as *Poetic Diction* instead of *Prosody*.

consideration of such previous contributions would, indeed, have been somewhat out of place. But some acknowledgement and even some account of these contributions might not have been ungracious, if only to remove the impression the book gives that no Europeans know anything much of value concerning the subjects treated of. Further, if the contributions of such workers as e.g. Tucker had been more apparently borne in mind, the section on Length and Stress could have been formulated more satisfactorily in general and more simply in particular, and the section on Intonation could not have ignored or over-simplified some of the most baffling complexities of the language in this respect. The former section, for instance, by no means makes clear that long length is found only in pause; and the syllabic nature of all nasals not immediately preceding vowels seems to be lost sight of occasionally, particularly in the case of the velar nasal—a point of critical importance for the section on Prosody, where this error perpetuates itself in more than one instance. In the section on Intonation, besides some slight confusion between single tones and tone-patterns, the over-simple classification of both of these, and the consequent inadequate treatment of variations in intonation-pattern of the same word in different positions constitute unsatisfactory features. It should be added, however, that in this latter section Dr. Schweltnus has given us some quite new and highly important and interesting information regarding intonation-phenomena in classes of words not hitherto treated in any published work, particularly the verb. And this information, together with what the author has to say even about aspects of intonation on which others have already made their results available, will be greatly welcomed alike by advanced scholars and by those whose acquaintance with the subject is in its initial stages.

The section on Prosody is introduced by some general and aptly-illustrated observations on the function of rhythm in general, and in poetry in particular, together with indications, again well illustrated, of some main characteristics of the language found in Northern Sotho poetry—the

use of archaic and compound words, and the frequent elision of sounds, syllables, and even whole words. The author then proceeds to offer an analysis of the rhythms to be found in Northern Sotho poetry of various kinds, ranging from the traditional, as illustrated by the proverb, the praise-name, and the praise-poem, to the modern, as represented both by the pseudo-European hymn-verse and song-stanza and by the return to traditional modes in the newer secular and sacred poetry couched in praise-poem form. The analysis is, once more, copiously illustrated with examples ranging over the whole wide field. All this material is brand-new, and, perhaps therefore not surprisingly, somewhat contentious here and there. Thus, for instance, one may ask whether the author has not been over-ready to see in traditional Sotho poetry (as distinct from imitations of European models, which imitations are, however, quoted indiscriminately with examples of the real Bantu thing) the more mechanically regular rhythms characteristic of traditional European poetry until modern versifiers broke with it; and whether this readiness has not from time to time led him into error in scanning some example of Sotho verse not according to the necessarily irregular incidence of the invariably penultimate stresses, but according to the demands of a verse-structure derived from European sources, and rather arbitrarily imposed from above. In this connection, incidentally, neglect amounting to negation of the fact that nasal, liquid and rolled consonants are syllabic except immediately before vowels, has played sad tricks with the scansion of more than one passage. The reviewer can here but state his doubt as to whether an analysis of Bantu metrical structure on these lines will, in the end, yield comprehensive and satisfactory results, and express his belief that a truer interpretation will be found in regarding Bantu verse as built up round a succession of nodes or points of strong stress, interbalanced in numbers and periods of incidence, with intervening irregular numbers of weaker stresses, not necessarily interbalanced in any way. But wherever the solution of this difficult problem lies, there is no doubt that Dr.

Schwellnus' work in this field will furnish most valuable material for all those interested in it.

The last three works on the list, though differing from each other in many a detail, show several main resemblances to each other, and may accordingly be considered together for convenience and to save space. They are all intended primarily for the Northern Sotho-speaking student, and written in his language—*Kxaša-Peu* for students in the various classes of Teacher-Training Colleges, *Thika-Poléló* for first-year students in such colleges and for sixth- and seventh-standard pupils in secondary schools, *Thutó ya Poléló* for fifth- and sixth-standard school pupils. They all aim to enable the learner to exercise and improve his knowledge of his mother-tongue, particularly in regard to the meanings and uses of words, phrases, idioms, proverbs, and figures of speech, but also in regard to grammatical forms and syntactical usages, word-building and phonology, and, in *Kxaša-Peu* more particularly, in regard to phonetics. They also all make use, to a greater or smaller extent, of similar methods of approach, including the presentation of passages, sentences, phrases or even single words which form the basis for a series of questions, on the Socratic principle of elucidating knowledge rather than instilling it. Emphasis is laid throughout on composition, from simple exercises in the completion of sentences and the writing of sentences on given models to fully-fledged essays on a large variety of topics. Formal grammar is relegated to a position of minor importance. The reviewer cannot help regarding this as a pity. What Africans need, in language as in other fields of study, is not merely knowledge, but systematized knowledge; and formal grammar, though it has its shortcomings and other disadvantages, is an excellent training in systematic thinking about certain aspects of language.

The orthography followed in each of these books is based on the principles officially recognized by the Transvaal Education Department,

as is that of Dr. Schwellnus' *Kima le Kxaló le Mešitó ya Dirétó*: but they differ slightly among themselves, and from the last-named book, in their application of these principles in detail. Similarly, the grammatical approach, though for the most part in each oriented in terms of the old view of Bantu grammar which is now elsewhere steadily making way for newer conceptions, also differs considerably in detail from book to book. Finally, as a result both of these differences and of lack of co-ordination of effort in this regard, there is considerable difference in the nature of the grammatical and other linguistic terminology employed, in addition to purely dialectal differences in the language generally. For none of these do the authors of the several books deserve any blame whatever—rather do they deserve much credit for the sincere and laborious and far from inept effort they have put into their work in these respects. But the differences, in the interest of the evolution of a standard literary Northern Sotho at least, and of a standard literary unified Sotho as an ultimate goal, will have, in course of time, to be levelled out by an ever-widening process of co-ordination among those in whose hands the future of the language lies. In particular, the need of a uniform linguistic terminology, not only for Northern Sotho alone, but also for the whole Sotho group, is not only apparent, but has become progressively more urgent. The problem should be tackled on broad lines, and soon, not only for one single Sotho language, or one single administrative area where such language is spoken, but also for the whole group, and for all the administrative territories where languages of the group are heard. For the solution of this as of many another problem concerned with Northern Sotho and with methods of approach to the language from a scientific and from a pedagogical point of view, these books will constitute rich storehouses of the most valuable material.

THE TONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NGOMBE VERB

E. W. PRICE

Bantu languages vary considerably among themselves in the relative importance they give to stress, tone and vowel-length in the enunciation of words. In one group, tone is the predominant characteristic, while stress and vowel-length are of minor importance.

Ngombe is one such language; tone plays a predominant rôle as shown below; stress is of such minor importance that even intelligent Natives, who readily recognize the position of tone in the words of their own language, find it difficult to decide where the stress of a given word lies; vowel-length¹ is of negligible significance, except where the elision of a consonant places two similar vowels in juxtaposition, and this cannot be called "significant" vowel-length for the purpose of this study.

The Ngombe people number about 150,000 and inhabit both banks of the Congo river (mainly the south) on the western side of its northernmost bend, the northern and southern limits being roughly the two tributaries Mongala and Lopori respectively.

Their north-eastern neighbours are the Sudanic Gbaka, to whose presence is due undoubtedly certain Sudanic traits in the language such as the velar-stop implosives *gb* and *kp*, and the use of many monosyllabic verbs in an auxiliary capacity. There is a strong tradition that they reached their present position by migration from the northwest and the resemblance between many of their words (e.g. *madiba*, water) with those of the Duala of the Cameroons confirms this.

Tonally, two significant tone positions are recognised in Ngombe called respectively high tone and low tone—and written *d*, *é*, etc. for high and *a*, *e*, for low. So typical are these that a new-comer, hearing the Lord's prayer spoken in unison has thought it was being intoned on two notes. The fact that in recitation of this sort the musical interval may be as much as a fifth heightens this impression; in normal speech

however the difference in pitch between the two tones is that of a major or minor third. In addition, there are certain dynamic variations of tone, such as the lowering of the tone of the last syllable of a sentence, and the raising of the tone level of a whole phrase to make it interrogative, while maintaining the relative tone intervals of the phrase.

The tonal structure of the Ngombe verb derives its interest from the following three observations—

1. There is no difference in the phonetic elements composing the past, present, and future tenses of the verb, the inflexion for time depending entirely on the tone pattern.

2. The position, whether high or low, of the tone of the first syllable of the stem is fixed, with the exception of certain repetitive ideophones, the following syllable or syllables being tonally inflected for time.

The position of this fixed tone affects the subjectival prefix in past tenses—

<i>nalángá</i> (verb: <i>lángá</i>)	<i>nǎdipá</i> (verb: <i>dipa</i>)
I read	I shut.

The subjectival prefix which is low-toned before a high-toned verb, is rising before a low-toned verb.

3. The Ngombe readily drop certain consonants, notably *l*, and of the two vowels thus juxtaposed, the second is elided even when it is the stem vowel of the verb. When this occurs, as seen below, the tone of the elided vowel does not lapse but is always incorporated in that of the persisting vowel according to the following scheme of tone addition :

high	+	low	=	falling	$\acute{a} + a = \acute{a}$
low	+	high	=	rising	$a + \acute{a} = \acute{a}$
high	+	high	=	high	$\acute{a} + \acute{a} = \acute{a}$
low	+	low	=	low	$a + a = a$
rising	+	low	=	rising	$\acute{a} + a = \acute{a}$
rising	+	high	=	rising	$\acute{a} + \acute{a} = \acute{a}$
falling	+	low	=	falling	$\acute{a} + a = \acute{a}$
falling	+	high	=	falling	$\acute{a} + a = \acute{a}$

In the following description of the Ngombe tone scheme, the disyllabic verb is taken as the standard. The polysyllabic verbs derive easily from this as shown.

The elided disyllabic—a term used for vowel verbs with elided initial vowel—is treated next, and the resemblance of its tone pattern to that of the monosyllabics noted.

The Disyllabic Verb

The Ngombe verb falls into two conjugations, the positive and the negative; of these, only the positive conjugation depends entirely for its time inflexion on tone and so it alone is considered here.

The primary inflexion for time being by tone as stated, further meaning is achieved by the use of a "continuative" suffix *-ká* and an enclitic suffix *-obí*. The continuative suffix *-ká* may be added to any form of the verb to make the action continuous, while the enclitic suffix *-obí* (cf. *lobí*: tomorrow, yesterday; Ngala) makes the time subsequent to that of the tense to which it is affixed—i.e. more recent, when attached to a past tense, and in the more distant future when attached to a future.

In general, the initial vowel of *obí* is elided and its tone incorporated in that of the preceding vowel, but in one dialect it remains spoken.

The Verb scheme is then as follows:—

VERB: *Lánga*: to read; *Na-*: 1st pers. sing. personal subjectival prefix.

POSITIVE CONJUGATION:

Indicative mood		(continuative)
Past: remote	<i>nalángá</i>	<i>nalángáká</i>
recent	<i>nalángábí</i>	<i>nalángákábí</i>
Present: perfect	<i>nalángí</i> (<i>bá-</i>)	<i>nalángákí</i> (<i>bá-</i>)
continuative		<i>nalángáká</i> (<i>bá-</i>)
Future: immediate	<i>nálángá</i>	<i>nálángáká</i>
		(see Note 3)
remote	<i>nalángabi</i> (<i>bá-</i>)	<i>nalángakabí</i> (<i>bá-</i>)
Conditional mood:		
present	<i>nákalángá</i>	
future	<i>nákalángábí</i>	
past	(an auxiliary verb is used)	

Subjunctive mood:

present	<i>nalángé</i>	<i>nalángáké</i>
future	<i>nalángébí</i>	<i>nalángákébí</i>

Note 1. In the remote and recent past tenses, dissimilation is practised in low-toned verbs, as follows: *nádipá*, *nádipáká*, *nádipábí*, *nádipákábí*.

Note 2. In the tenses indicated by (*bá-*) above, the tone of the subjectival concord is high for the 3rd person plural in the personal class, and all impersonal classes, thus: *nalángí*, but *bálángí*, *jílángí*, *mílángí*.

Note 3. The continuative form of the immediate future is used consistently as an habitual tense—*nálángáká*: I habitually read.

Note 4. The time sense can be defined approximately thus: In the past,

present to yesterday:	perfect tense used
yesterday to a month ago:	recent past tense
more past than a month:	remote past tense.
Future: present to a month ahead:	immediate future tense used
more future than a month:	remote future tense used.

Note 5. The continuative suffix *-ka* becomes *-ke* or *-ko* when the preceding vowel of the verb is *ε* or *o* respectively.

It is seen then that the word *nalangaka* can have three different meanings according to the tone pattern associated with it:

<i>nalángáká</i> (continuative remote past)	: I was reading
<i>nalángáká</i> (present tense)	: I am reading
<i>nálángáká</i> (habitual)	: I habitually read.

or again:

<i>nalángábí</i> (recent past)	: I read
<i>nalángabí</i> (remote future)	: I shall read.

Polysyllabic Verbs

These verbs, whether derived verbs e.g. *lángéja*, causative of *lángá*, or verbs originally polysyllabic e.g. *kátata*: to shrink in width, follow the disyllabic scheme, each syllable after the first taking the same tone as the second syllable of the typical verb *lángá*.

Thus:	<i>nalángáká</i>	<i>nakátátáká</i>
	<i>nalángábí</i>	<i>nakátátábí</i>
	<i>nalángáká</i>	<i>nakátatáká</i> .

Elided Disyllabic Verbs

are of two kinds.

(a) True vowel verbs, about 100 of them, where the initial vowel is elided and its tone incorporated in that of the preceding vowel—

e.g. verb: *ika*—to hear

nāka (*naika*)—I heard

nākākā (*nākaika*)—if I hear.

(b) Verbs where a consonant other than the first is elided, so that two similar verbs are juxtaposed—

e.g. *ke(nd)ε* → *ke'ε* → *ke* = to go

(The consonant is not elided in derived forms such as the noun *mokendeli*, and the causative *kendeja*).

Here, tone addition is practised as indicated previously

e.g. (*nalāngakā*)

nake(nd)eké → *nake' eké* → *nakeké*.

(*nāḍipābī*)

nāke(nd)ēbī → *nāke'ēbī* → *nākébī*

Only one exception to this has been found in all the verbs examined, viz. the present tense of high-toned elided disyllabic verbs (*l'ε*) is *nalékké* and not *naléké* as one would expect; (*nalāngakā*): *nalé'eké* → (*nalékké*) → *nalékké*.

Monosyllabic Verbs

There are 15 or so of these, of which *pá* (give) is an example of the high-toned group and *kwa* (fall) of the low-toned group.

It is an interesting observation that the tonal pattern of the verbal forms of these verbs is the same as that of the elided disyllabic when they appear monosyllabic owing to elision of the second consonant of the stem.

Thus: *ke(kende)*: *nāké* *nakebi* *nākébī*

kwa: *nākwā* *nakwabi* *nākwābī*.

The distinction between the two becomes

evident in the perfect tense and the subjunctive forms:

<i>lānga</i>	<i>nalāngi</i>	<i>nālāngé</i>
<i>lé</i>	<i>nalét</i>	<i>náléé</i>
<i>pá</i>	<i>napi</i>	<i>napé</i>
<i>dipa</i>	<i>nadipt</i>	<i>nádipé</i>
<i>ke</i>	<i>naket</i>	<i>nákeé</i>
<i>kwa</i>	<i>nakwi</i>	<i>nākwé</i>

Note 1: The second vowel of *ke* (*kende*) becomes *-i* in the perfect and *-e* in the subjunctive and elision becomes no longer possible with the preceding *ε*.

Note 2: In monosyllabic verbs, the subjunctive inflexion is made with *-ε* instead of the usual *-e*.

Note 3: The rising tone of *nakwi* represents the addition of the adjacent low and high tones of *naké*.

Summary:

A Bantu language (Ngombe) is described in which verbal inflexions for time are made by tone without phonetic change.

The tone pattern becomes involved frequently because of the frequency with which consonants are dropped, but it is found that the resulting tone pattern can be predicted by a scheme of tone addition.

Verbs of every sort—disyllabic, polysyllabic, vowel verbs, monosyllabic—have been examined and found to follow the typical verbal tone pattern.

In Ngombe, the tone pattern is more consistently constant than either stress, vowel length or phones.

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AN UNUSUAL BANTU TALE OF THE LITTLE-HARE SERIES

Recorded and Translated by C. M. DOKE

Lamba shares with other Bantu languages the usual tales of the Little-hare series, those shewing his cunning over the other animals, and that shewing his cunning over the "March Hare." In the following story we have one, which I have not heard of elsewhere, in which are described the exploits of the wifeless little hare who was so like his married friend that the latter's wife could not tell the difference. His power over the women-folk is further evidenced by his deception of the farmer's wife. The tale well brings out the human

attributes applied by the Lamba to the animals in their tales—they act and speak as people, eat and wash like people. (What mirth each reference to the bathing brings out in the hearers of this tale!) And yet, when the little hare comes to the eleusine garden he acts like a hare, eats like a hare and is trapped like a hare. Seldom have I heard a Lamba folk-tale told that gives such rollicking mirth as this one.

* * *

ICISIMICISYO ICĀWAKALULU NAŴA-KALULU AŴAYĀŴO AŴALI NEŴA-KASI

Pōpele akatakakwete-mukasi ati, Wemwame, twēnde tukafule ututemo! Nekuya, kawāfulō' tutemo tuwīli, wōwīlo kawākwi, imipini kawāwā-wa-ko.¹ Lomba umbi kafulē'fumo, umbi naye ifumo. Kawīli kawāfulē'mifwi, umbi naye itatu, umbi naye kawīli itatu. Lomba nekwīma, lomba wālukuya.

Pakwēwā'ti wafika kumbali yāmusi, ako akāli nemukasi nekulekana. Kūmfwa ati, Wemwame nawewo wikate apākutema.² Pakwēwā'ti bwācō' lucelo, nekuya kwikata wōwīlo. Pakwēwā'ti wai-kata, nekubwela kumusi. Akako akatakakwete-mukasi, pakwēwā'ti kabwela, ati, Mba ndukulyē'ndo nesikwete-mukasi? Pakwēwā'ti bwaca kawīli, uyo uwāli nemukasi nekuya mukutema. Akatakakwete-mukasi, pakwēwā'ti akasūwā kātela, nekufika muṇanda ati, Yō! Nāfwa . . . ē! Koko! Tēka-po akasima!

Nensima nekutēka-po.³ Nekulya kawālya. Ati, Pano pīsyā'mēnda, nsambe pamuwīli! Nemēnda kawāpīsyā nekusamba kawāsamba. Lomba neku-fuma ati, Tanje nje-po ṅku, mpitane mumusi.

¹ *wāwā*, scorch, here is used of the heating of the axe haft when fixing in the head.

² *tēma*, fell timber, as is done in making new gardens, the *ifiteme*, stretches of felled timber, forming a valuable ash-manure which is hoed in for planting.

THE STORY OF MR. LITTLE-HARE AND HIS FELLOW WHO HAD A WIFE

Now the one who had no wife said, "Mate, let us go and forge axes!" And they went and forged two axes, and both of them fitted them in handles, and hardened the handles in the fire. Then the one forged a spear, the other also a spear. Further, they forged arrows, the one three, and the other three also. Then they arose and went away.

When they reached the outskirts of the village, the one who had a wife parted company (with his fellow). And he said, "Mate, you too choose a place for tree-felling (for a garden)." Now when the next morning dawned, both went out to choose. When they had made their selections, they returned to the village. And the little one who had no wife, on his return, said (to himself): "But, what am I going to eat, I who have no wife?" And when another day dawned, the one who had a wife went off to fell timber. And the wifeless one, on seeing that the sun was well advanced, came to the house and said: "Yo! I'm dead! Come on, put on some porridge to cook!"

So she (i.e. the other's wife) put on the porridge. And they⁴ ate their meal. He said, "Now, warm some water for me to have a bath!" And she heated the water, and he had a bath. Then he

³ The two little-hares looked so alike that the wife did not recognise that the visitor was not her husband!

⁴ This might be interpreted as an honorific plural, "and he ate," as is doubtless the case at the end of the next paragraph.

Olo, *impindi yōpele'o ynekēne kāmukasi neku-fika, nekupōsō'tutemo mumulyango. Ati, Yō! Nāfwa . . . ē! Koko! Tēka-po akasima! Kūmfwō' mukasi ati, Wukumo mwālulukulya! Ntēke-po naimbi? Kakwangulwa lukoso nefyākupa-fāla.¹ Kūmfwa ati, Lekēni ntēke-po! Nekutēka-po nensima, kawālyā.*

Lomba kawīli ulucelo nekuca. Akako akataka-kwete-mukasi nekwisa nekufukulō' mfwembe, nekufisya mumbali yaŵulo mfwembe, nekufuma-mo mufwembe, nekwinjila muŵanda. Ati, Yō, nāfwa kumiti nakatala! Ati, Tēka-po akasima, tulye! Nensima katēka-p, nekunaŵya kanaŵya,² nekulya kakalya. Ati, Tēka-po amēnda, nsambe! Lomba nemēnda nekusiŵ' kusamba. Lomba nekufuma, olo, nekwinjila mufwembe.

Impindi yōpelē'yo nemulume wākwē nekufika, nekupōsō' tutemo³ mumulyango. Kūmfwa ati, Yō! Nāfwa, kukatala nemulanda!⁴ Koko! Tēka-po akasima, tulye!⁵ Ati, Newaswe, wukumo nanaŵya! Kūmfwa ati, Mba wukumo wanaŵya, ninani wanaŵyina? Kakwangulwa lukoso, kawamutoŵa mumusili. Ati, Lekeni, ntēke-po mwewāna-wāwēne!⁶ Nensima kakanāya, lomba kalukulya. Kūmfwa aŵalume ati, Wona wemukasi wānji, pamupini wakatemo ndukuŵika-po amalembō atatu, pēfumo aŵili, umbi umufwi nekukotola-ko ukutwi. Nako muni mufwembe kalukulemba pafyākako, fyōnse kakacita koti nifyōpelē' fyo ifi kacitile akēne kāmukasi.

¹ lit. He simply boiled with thrashings.

² *nāya* indicates the most important part of the process of making the thick porridge pap, the muscular stirring in the pot and adding of fresh meal until all is of the right consistency to dish up; it might therefore be translated by "make" or "cook," as well as "stir."

³ lit. axes.

⁴ *nemulanda* is generally used as a negative of annoyance of the 1st person singular, meaning "Not I!"

went out, saying, "I'm just going over here to take a stroll round the village."

Oh my! at that very moment the real owner of the wife arrived and threw down (his) implements in the doorway. He said, "Yo! I'm dead! Come on, put on some porridge to cook!" Then his wife said, "You've just eaten! Am I to put on some more?" He just boiled with rage and thrashed her. And she: "Do stop, and let me put it on!" So she put on the porridge and he ate.

And then again day dawned. The little wifeless one came and burrowed a tunnel, and made the tunnel reach to the edge of the bed (beneath the house), and out he came from the burrow, and entered the house. He said, "Yo! I am dead with the trees, how tired I am!" He said, "Put on some porridge, and let us eat!" So she put on the porridge, and stirred it, and he ate. He said, "Put on water for me to have a bath." Then he went out; oh my, and into the burrow he went.

At that very moment her husband arrived, and threw down (his) implements in the doorway. And he said, "Yo! I'm done for! How dreadfully tired I am! Come on! Put on some porridge and let me eat!" She said, "Not I, I have only just made it!" And he said, "How is it you've just made it, for whom have you made it?" And he simply boiled with rage, and hurled her down on the ground. She said, "Stop it, and let me put it on, my lord!" So she made the porridge and he ate. Then her husband said, "Look, my wife, on the handle of the axe I make three notches, on the spear two, and from one arrow I break off a barb." And the other little one in the burrow marked his (implements), everything he did just as did the owner of the wife.

Nothing doing!" But here, reference is stronger to the original meaning of *umuianda*, slave, menial; and the phrase is an interjection meaning "I'm treated like a slave."

⁵ lit. "let us eat"; honorific plural used by the head of the house when speaking of himself to his wife.

⁶ *umwāna-wāwēne*, lit. "child of an owner" or "child of a real person" is used to indicate an independent, free person in contrast to a slave. Here the vocative is used interjectionally in pleading.

Pakwēwa ati bwācō' lucelo kakaya¹ mukutema. Ino-mpindi nekufika ako ati, Yō, nāfwa newaswe ! Tēka-ko akasima ! Kawenda ! Kūmfwō' mwanakasi ati, Palya pakatemo pali amalembō atatu, mwilukukana ati nsilile-po insima, nekatemo amalembō atatu nēfumo amalembō aḡili ! Ati, Tēka-po ! Olo ! katēka-po nensima, nekunaṅya kanaṅya, nekulya kaḡalya. Ati, Tēka-po amēnda, nsambe, nāfwa pamuḡili paḡiḡa kufipampansya ! Nemēnda katēka-po. Kaḡasamba. Ati, Tanje nje-po ili mpitana-po kumukulo !

Ino-mpindi nemulume wākwe nekufika. Kūmfwa ati, Yō, nāfwa ! Tēka-po akasima, kawenda ! Ati, A ! wukumo mwālukulya, nālukupendē' fintu fyēnu amalembō ! Ati, Kōku, wemukasi wānji, ulicenjele ! Neusima kanaṅya, nekulya kaḡalya.

Pakwēwā'ti bwācō' lucelo, kakaya mukutema. Kakalaya nemukasi ati, Wona, wemukasi wānji, akatemo nāsyā ! Lomba kalukupinta lyēṅke' fumo. Kakaya mumpayga ili kēnda. Nakako nekuḡūle' fumo lyēṅka, kakalukwisa. Nekufika muṅanda ati, Yō ! nākatale newaswe ! Ati, Tēka-po akasima ṅkalye ! Nekunaṅya kanaṅya, nekulya kakalya. Ati, Tēka-po amēnda, tusambe ! Olo, pakusamba nekufuma, ati, Tanje ṅkalye-po utufungo ! Nekwīnjila muncembwe. Muncembwe umo wānjile netulo nekulāla.

Impindi yōpelē' yo nekēne kāmukasi nekufika, ati, Ukukatala kulukufula newaswe.² Tēti ndukwēnda-po wāTyembo !³ Ati, Tēka-po akasima, tulye ! Kūmfwō' mukasi ati, Wukumo walukulya ! Kūmfwa ati, Lēlo neḡō ī, tēti ndukupōsa-po wāTyembo ! Insima kakawātēkela-po. Kaḡalya nekulya. Kūmfwa ati, Wona-ko, wemukasi wānji, mailo ṅkawēpesyō' kuya mukutema, ukawōne-po imbiko.⁴ Kūmfwa ati, Ciweme.

¹ Note the interplay of concords. Here *ka-* agreeing with the diminutive class word *akalulu* (pl. *utululu*), the little hare; elsewhere *wa-* agreeing with the Class Ia, *Wakalulu*, Mr. Little-hare.

² lit. Being tired is abundant, ah me !

Now when day dawned, off it went to fell timber. At that time that (other) little one arrived, and said, "Yo! How dreadfully I'm done in! Put on some porridge! Get a move on!" Then the woman said, "There on the axe are three notches, don't you deny and say you didn't eat any porridge, with three notches on the axe and two notches on the spear!" He said, "Put it on!" And so she put on the porridge, and made it, and he ate. He said, "Put on water for me to have a bath, I'm done in, my body is uncomfortable with the wood-chips!" So she put on water. And he bathed. And he said, "Now just let me go out for a stroll by the river."

At that very time her husband arrived. And he said, "Yo! I'm done for! Put on some porridge! Get a move on!" She said, "What cheek! You've just been eating, I checked the notches on your things!" He said, "Nothing doing, my wife; you are cute!" So she prepared porridge, and he ate.

And when day dawned, off it went to fell timber. And it instructed its wife, saying, "See, my wife, the axe I have left behind!" And it carried only the spear. Off it went into the forest for a walk. And that little one (too) took up only a spear, and along it came. And it reached the house and said, "Yo! How dreadfully tired I am!" And he said, "Put on some porridge for me to eat!" So indeed she prepared it, and he ate. And he said, "Put on water for me to have a bath!" Oh my, when he had bathed he went out saying, "Just let me go and eat some *fungo* fruit!" And into the burrow he went. And there in the burrow where he went, he went right off to sleep.

Now at that very moment the owner of the wife, too, arrived, and said, "Oh how terribly tired I am! I can travel no more, by Tyembo!" He said, "Put on some porridge and let me eat!" Thereupon the wife said, It is just now that you have eaten! He said, "I today, not a scrap; I am not lying, by Tyembo!" So she put on porridge for him. And he had a good feed. Then he said, "Look, my wife, tomorrow I'll pretend to go to fell timber, and you will see an omen!" And she said, "All right!"

³ This is a common Lamba oath.

⁴ Omen, generally of evil to come; here it means something strange, marvellous.

Pakwēwā' ti kuwūka ako akatakāli nemukasi, ati, Nsiumpfwi-lepo lelo ifiwalukulawila, kani wālukum-pinjila, kani mwanakasi wantula. Kūmfwa ati, Ndukuya mumpanga. A! pakwēwā'ti bwācō' lucelo, lombā akēne kamukasi nekuwūlō' wūta nekatemo nēfumo, nekwēnda-ko filya. Olo! nekufutuka nekubwela nakucipembe, nekulukulēle. Pakwēwā ati akako akatakakwete-mukasi ati, Nāfwē'nsala, kani ŋkalye-po akasima, pakuti ifi wālukulawila nsināūmfwi-lepo. Kakēnda-po panini, kakēmakana. Limbi limbi kakakululwila. Ati, Mba ndukuya lukoso newaswe! Lomba mba wakanjipaye!

Nekufika kakafika. Nekupōsō' tutemo mumulya-ngo koykolo, newēne pilicisi. Ati, Yō! nāfwa nemulanda¹ kufiti! Nekufika, kawēkala pawulo, nembokoma kakawūla, nāfwaka kakawika-po, neluwāngula pēūlu. Ati, Tēka-po insima, tulye! Naye umwanakasi celele lukoso. Ati, Kansi cīne niwāmbi nālukunaŋyine'nsima! Olo, nekēne kāmukasi nekuwūka. Kakawāsompōlēmbokoma, kakawātōwela mumutwi. Ati, Yō! nāfwa nekalanda! Yōnse ninsala yāncita fino! Kōli nemukasi, tekukucita-po fino! Lomba kalukuwāpama. Olo, kawāso-poka, netutemo nekusililila, nekuyō'luwilo mumpanga.

Kulya uko kāile ati, Ala! Pano wāmpuma! Ati, Pano ndukufwa kunsala, mba ndyē'ndo? Akēne kāmukasi kanjikata! Olo, lombā kalukuya ili kēnda. Kakatiwūcila² mufitumbo. Kasangane nikumawo. Kūmfwa ati, E kansi pano nakupuluka! Lomba kalukulya. Kakēkuta nekubwelela mucitumbo, lombā kalilēle.

Pakwēwā'ti wēse-ko awēne wāmarwo, ati, Amawo wāsilō'kulya kutunama! Lomba wālukuposō'

¹ Umulanda literally means (i) retainer, servant of a chief, and (ii) orphan adopted by the chief; in the expression *nemulanda*, it is often used as a negative exclamation, meaning "Not I!"

Now when that little wifeless one woke up, he said (to himself), "Today I didn't hear what they were saying, whether they were preparing trouble for me, or whether the woman has 'split' on me." And he said, "I am off into the forest." My! when the morning dawned, the little owner of the wife took his bow and axe and spear, and went off like that. My! then he turned back and returned, and behind the screen he went and down he lay. As to that little wifeless one, he said, "I am dead with hunger, I wonder if I could eat a little porridge, because I didn't hear what they said." And he walked on a little and then stood still. From time to time he walked on. He said, "Why should I go on like this, not I! And what if they *do* kill me!"

So he arrived. And he threw down his implements in the doorway, clatter; and himself rushed in. He said, "Yo! I, poor slave, am done in by the trees!" So he arrived and sat down on the bed, and took out his calabash pipe, and put tobacco in and hemp on top. He said, "Put on porridge, and let me eat!" But the woman was dead silent. Then she said, "Well I never, it was really someone else for whom I was making porridge!" Oh my, then the owner of the wife rose up. And he snatched away from him his calabash pipe and smashed it on his head. And he said, "Yo! I'm done for, poor slave that I am! It is only hunger that has caused me to act like this! If one had a wife, this wouldn't happen to one!" Then he went on hitting him. Oh my, and he slipped away, and left behind his implements, and sped off into the forest.

Over yonder where it went, it said, "Alas! Now he has beaten me!" He said, "Now I'm going to die of hunger, what am I going to eat? The owner of the wife has caught me!" Oh my, off he goes and travels. And (after a while) he lights upon some garden clearings. And he finds that there is eleusine there. Then he said, "Ah, so now I'll survive!" Then he ate. So he gorged himself and went back to the clearing and went off to sleep.

Now when the owner of the eleusine came, he said, "The eleusine has all been eaten by little

² *tiwūcila*, applied form of *tiwūka*, crack open, here means to emerge from the dense forest into an opening where there is a village or a garden.

twāndo, nekusya wāteya. Nekulāla kawālāla. Pakwēwā'ti wusiku Wakalulu ati, Pano tukalye ! Olo kawēkatwa kutwāndo, nekulemō'kulwila. Pakwēwā'ti lucelo, awēne wācitumbo nekāna kāwō ati, Pita kulya ukawōne-po utwāndo ! Pakwēwā'ti apo kali-ko kumwāndo ati, pano awēne wācicino wāisa ! Olo kawāwēpesyō'kufwa. Pakwēwā'ti wēse-po, ati, Kano akanama kāfwila-ko kumwāndo ! Nekukakakulula, nekupēlō' mwānice. Kūmfwa ati, Twala kuli wānoko, nsaygane wāipika, insima wānañyina-po ikulu, mpulililō'kulya !

Nako akānice lomba kālukuya. Pakwēwā'ti kaēnda, kafikō'kutali, kūmfwa kucifusi akanama ati, Tutule¹ wé ! Nako akānice kakalemō'kucenenta, ati, Mbē'co cālāwila cili kulipi ? Kūmfwa ati, Ulukucenente'ndo wé ? tutule ! Akānice nekutula. Kūmfwa ati, Pano tanjila-ko, katuya ! Kūmfwa ati, Wewame wawiso wākulaya ati syani ? Kūmfwa akānice ati, Wātāta wāēwā ati, Twalā' kanama ako kumusi kuli wānoko, wākēpika, insima wanañyine-po ikulu, njise ndye ! Kūmfwa ati, Kōku, wālawila ati, Twala wāciwusa wānji kumusi, wākawēpaille-po kombolwe uyo umukulu, nensima kawāwanānyina, wālye wēkute, nemēnda wāwāsamfye ! Kūmfwa akānice ati, E, kansi emwe mwāūmfwa !

Lomba wālukuya, nakumusi nekufika. Kūmfwa wāñyina ati, Ulukwisa nekanama ili kēnda ? Kūmfwa akānice ati, Aka-kanama wāmpēla wātāta ati, Twala kuli wānoko, wākēpika. . . Kūmfwa kakalulu ati, A ! Kōku mwandini ! Uyu tōmfwilisye. Netō nemwōne wālukulaya, wāēwā ati, Watwale kumusi wāciwusa wānji, wākawēpaille kombolwe uyo umukulu, nensima wāwanānyine, nekulya wālye ! Pakwēwā'ti wāsilo'kulya wāwatekele-po amēnda, wāwāsamfye pamuwili ! Kūmfwa wāñyina akokānice ati, E pano nāūmfwa ! Olo, nakombolwe kawatamfya, nekwikata kawamwikata, nekwipaya

¹ *tutule*, put us down ; plural used in self-laudation.

animals !” And he set to work weaving string-traps, and left them set. And away he went to sleep. Now when it was night Mr. Little-hare said, “ Now let's have something to eat !” Oh my, and he got caught in the string-traps, and wearied himself fighting to get free. And when it was morning, the owner of the garden-clearing, with his little son, said, “ Pass over there and have a look at the string-traps !” Now where the little thing was in the trap, it realised that the owner of this (trap) had come ! Oh my ! and he pretended to be dead. And when they came there, (the father) said, “ Here is a little animal that has died in the string-trap !” And he untied it, and gave it to the lad. And he said, “ Take it to your mother, and let me find when I come that she has cooked it, and prepared a quantity of porridge, so that I may eat at once.”

And so off the lad went. Now while he was going and had got some distance, he heard the little creature on his shoulder say, “ Put us down, you !” And the lad looked round everywhere, and said, “ Wherever is that which spoke ?” And he said, “ What are you looking round at, you ? Put us down !” The lad put him down. And he said, “ Friend, what did your father instruct you to do ?” Then the lad said, “ Father said, ‘ Take that little animal to the village to your mother, and let her cook it, and let her prepare plenty of porridge, that I may come and eat !’ ” And he said, “ Not so, he said, ‘ Take my friend to the village, and let her kill for him the big cock, and prepare porridge for him, that he may eat and be satisfied ; and let her wash him with water !’ ” Then the lad said, “ Oh, so it was you who heard !”

So off they went, and reached the village. Then the mother said, “ Are you coming with a little animal walking along ?” Then the lad said, “ This little animal father gave to me saying, ‘ Take to your mother, and tell her to cook. . .’ ” But the little hare said, “ Ah ! don't believe him ! He didn't hear properly. He gave instructions to me myself and said, ‘ Take my friend to the village, and let her kill for him the big cock, and prepare porridge for him, that he may eat properly. And when he has finished eating, let her put on water for him, and wash his body !’ ” Then the mother of that lad said, “ Oh, now I under-

kaŵēpaya, nekwiipika kaŵēpika, nensima nekunanya.

Pakwēwā'ti wāsilo'kulya, nekuwātekela nemēnda, nekusamfya kawāwasamfya. Kūmfwā'ti, Pano fumyēni isasa, ēfi wāndaya waciwusa ati wālukulēle. Pōsonde uko kawācike-ko umulando, pēūlu apa napo umulando, nēsasa wānsike pēūlu. Lomba wālukulēle kulya kungsi.

Olo, impindi yōpelē'yo neŵalume nekufika. Kūmfwā'ti, Akanama kēsa mwāipika? Kūmfwa awākasi ati, Kansi waciwusa wēnu, awā mwālaya ati, Kawēpaille kombolwe nensima wāwānanyine, nemēnda muwāsamfye! Kūmfwā'walume ati, Muka-nani ungalukusamfye'nama amēnda? Kawālukutola lukoso umupini, Kūmfwa ati, Mba yāya-pi? Kūmfwā'ti, Mba wālēle mpa! Nekuficila-po kapa mumulando. Olo, nekulapukamo, kaya-ko uluwilo mumpanga. Tukēkate, tukēkate,¹ nimpanga lukoso!

Cāpela'kasimi.

stand!" Oh my! so they chased the cock, and caught him indeed, and killed him indeed, and cooked him indeed, and stirred up the porridge.

Now when he had finished eating, they put on water for him, and washed him indeed. And he said, "Now bring out a sleeping mat; this is what my friend instructed me, that I should sleep. Outside there let them prop a log against it, and here above a log; and let them arrange the mat on top." Then he went to sleep there underneath.

Oh my! at that very moment the husband arrived. And he said, "Where is the little animal that you have cooked?" And (his) wife said, "Good gracious, your friend, of whom you gave instructions saying, 'let her kill the cock for him, and let her prepare porridge for him, and wash him with water!'" And (her) husband said, "Whose wife would wash an animal with water?" And he just took up an axe handle. And he said, "Where has it gone?" And she said, "Here he is sleeping here!" And he dealt a mighty blow crash on the log. Oh my! and it shot out, and sped off into the forest. Try how they might to catch it, it is just in the forest!¹

The tale is ended.

¹ A story similar to the ending of this is to be found in the Inamwanga tale *Ekalulu numpombo* (The Hare and the Klipspringer), published by E. H. Dewar in her *Chinamwanga Stories*, Livingstonia 1900, pp. 56-61.

lit. Let us catch it, let us catch it!

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

Colonial Studies at Oxford

Recognizing the increasing importance of the study of colonial subjects, the University of Oxford has taken steps to co-ordinate and advance the work already being done there in this field. An Institute of Colonial Studies has been established; a new Senior Research Fellowship in Comparative Colonial law (i.e. Native law) has been instituted at Brasenose College; a lectureship in colonial economics has been endowed by the United Africa Company; and provision has been made for a further lectureship in colonial administration.

Dr. C. K. Meek has been appointed to the Fellowship in Colonial law. Dr. Meek was formerly Anthropological Officer in the Nigerian Administrative Service and is the author of several well-known studies relating to tribes in Nigeria.

In promoting these new decrees in Congregation, Dr. W. T. S. Stallybrass, the principal of Brasenose College, pointed out that the serious study of the problems of the British colonial empire had been too much neglected, but that it was clear that in the future, colonial studies would attract a great deal more attention than they had done hitherto, and in this development the universities would have an important part to play. There was still a wide area of unexplored territory in the field of colonial administration. "The success of the new determination to develop the peoples and resources of the colonial empire will largely depend on the willingness of the universities to encourage researchers and to provide teaching in colonial subjects", said Dr. Stallybrass. "Research at the universities is a necessary preliminary to that wider knowledge of the colonial peoples and their countries, which will have such beneficial effects on policy. Again, advanced courses will in all probability be required for officers in the Colonial Service after they have had some years service in the colonies. . . . In the field of law, the relationship between British and Native courts and the use of British law as an instrument through which to effect civilization and uniformity raises urgent and little studied problems."

The new committee on colonial studies will also consider other proposals designed to encourage the study of colonial geography, anthropology and constitutional law.

* * * *

Rev. R. Ellenberger

By the death on 9 January 1944, at the age of 70, of the Rev. René Ellenberger, B. ès L., officier de l' instruction publique, chevalier de la légion d' honneur, a heavy loss has been sustained by the Department of Bantu Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand, in which he lectured on the Sotho language for a number of years.

Of a pioneer missionary family, René Ellenberger was born in a cave in the mountains of Basutoland in troublous times of war. He learnt Sotho as a child, was educated in France, graduating in literature in Paris, and becoming a prominent athlete, representing France in football against Scotland on one occasion. He then went as a missionary to the unhealthy Ogowe region of French Congo, where he lasted a longer spell than most at that time—twelve years—having thrilling adventures with pythons and once a lone fight with a gorilla. His linguistic ability was shown in his mastery of Fang and Galwa, two languages of the North-Western Bantu zone.

On his return to South Africa, he lived for some time with his old parents, helping his father in the translation of the latter's *History of the Basotho* (published in English in 1912) into Sotho. After his father's death he took charge of a mission station in Basutoland, and later of the work of the Paris Missionary Society on the Reef. During this time he continued the translation of the *History*, portions of which were published serially in the *Leselinyana*, a mission periodical in Basutoland. The University of the Witwatersrand took advantage of his intimate knowledge of Sotho, and he became a part-time lecturer in the Department of Bantu Studies.

As a teacher he was outstandingly successful. He took a personal interest in each student and his work, giving meticulous care and thought to

each individual. To each he gave a Native name which he used in class. In this work he will be deeply missed.

René Ellenberger represented the very best in Sotho : he was a purist as regards both vocabulary and construction in the language. He deplored the tendency among many young Basotho towards careless expression in speech and writing ; and did all he could to encourage the development of the best kind of literature in the language.

The fall of France was a severe blow to him. Friends and relatives were involved, and he laboured unceasingly to get into touch with them and send them help. Doubtless the plight of his beloved France hastened the death of this grand old man, who gave his all to bring help and comfort to others.

* * * *

Vernacular Publications

Librarians and cataloguers dealing with African languages are often in serious difficulty as to how to classify publications printed in the vernaculars. It would be of great assistance to them and to

others if publishers would see that *all* vernacular publications bore a translation of the title in English (or some other European language) and the name of the language employed. This could be done either on the title-page or on a sub-title page. If a concise indication of the contents could also be given, it would be a great advantage. The sub-title page indication is what is followed in the "Bantu Treasury Series" ; for instance No. VI reads : "*UGubudele naMazimuximu* (A Zulu one-act play, 'Gubudele and the Cannibals' by N. N. T. Ndebele)."

* * * *

Back Numbers

The Government Archivist in Southern Rhodesia is anxious to complete his set of *Bantu Studies*. He requires Vol. 1, Nos. 1-3 (original edition, not the reprint) with index and Vol. III, Nos. 3 and 4, which are all out of print. He would be glad to hear from any of our subscribers who may care to sell these numbers. His address is Salisbury. We should also be glad to hear as we are sometimes asked for complete sets.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Britain and Her Dependencies. By LORD HAILEY. 1943. London: *Longmans*. 48 pp. 6d.

The previous four pamphlets in this series have set a high standard and Lord Hailey has more than maintained this standard in his contribution of the fifth of the series. Students of colonial questions have come to expect the product of clear and penetrating thought in everything coming from the pen of Lord Hailey, and they will not be disappointed in this pamphlet. A whole wealth of information is crowded into less than 50 pages.

Lord Hailey illustrates the character of colonial policy by enumerating and dealing with the present-day problems of the administration of these territories. Four main problems are dealt with—improvement of the standards of living; development of the social services; issues arising from the existence of “plural” communities, and political development. He believes that the improvement of the standards of living is of first importance as “the majority of the population of the dependencies are still at a stage at which their primary concern must be in questions relating to their own standards of life.” Political institutions cannot be built up on foundations of poverty, unsatisfactory health or undeveloped minds. The term “standards of life” is taken to imply not merely material conditions necessary to physical well-being, but also the development of educational and other agencies which contribute to better social organisation.

Though the principle of “trusteeship” had been accepted, it had, nevertheless, been left to private initiative to act as the primary agency in the improvement of the conditions of material and social life. There is now, however, recognition of the fact that the State has a responsibility. This was demonstrated in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, authorising expenditure up to £5 million a year for ten years on schemes of social welfare and material betterment.

Issues arising from the existence of “plural” communities in certain dependencies create acute

problems. “The world probably affords no problem more stubborn than that presented by the contact of communities of a widely different racial composition and social character, in circumstances which give to one a position of political or economic superiority over the other.” Even if the doctrine of “segregation” or “parallel rule” which is the characteristic of the Union of South Africa influences the outlook of Europeans further north, “it has never been accepted by the governments of the dependencies as a policy which should regulate legislative and administrative action”. Three essential steps are necessary to meet the present position. Firstly, a more important part to be played by the more advanced section of the peoples of the dependencies in the administration of their own affairs; secondly, a fuller entrance into the economic life of their country by this section of the people, and, thirdly, the education of European communities to realise that social attitudes in the adjustment of racial differences are as important as “moral rectitude or political liberality”.

Difficulties of evolving a satisfactory scheme of political development are discussed and the author indicates the desirability of retaining official control, particularly in East African dependencies, until the Native community has developed sufficiently to enable it to “share political power with the European minority on terms which we can regard as just to both sides”.

“A British Commonwealth of Nations can have no place for peoples who are condemned to be permanently ‘backward’ or for areas that must be always ‘depressed’”. It can have no place for communities which cannot look with some confidence on a future in which they will rank as full associates in the partnership which it represents.”

The pamphlet is of great value, and should be studied by all who are interested in questions of colonial policy.

PERCY IBBOTSON.

Labour in the Colonies. Some Current Problems. 1942. London: *Fabian Colonial Bureau and Gollancz*. 47 pp. 1s.

The future of the British Colonies even in these times of stress provides plenty of scope for debate. The Fabian Colonial Bureau has done us a service in looking at the Colonies as a whole from the important standpoint of labour. There emerges from this report a distinct impression of a policy of *festina lente*—a slow march onward (even slower in wartime) towards a just settlement of conflicting individual and social interests. And the old problem emerges: whether it is possible to effect such a settlement, whether society is not composed of interests necessarily competing with each other in the broadest sense of the term, whether in satisfying the interests of one you are not sacrificing the interests of others. At bottom the problem is an economic one, not a legal one. Thus the paradoxical statements in the report that the comparatively high standard of living in England is based in part on the low standards of living in the Colonies, while the low wages in the Colonies threaten wages in the mother country.

The report does not go into such niceties. It is valuable, however, in giving a survey of various aspects of the labour problems of all the Colonies. Trade unions, it shows, must be registered under the relevant laws, a rule which the authors uphold as ensuring the financial integrity of the organisations. The collapse of the I.C.U., and indeed of many of South Africa's early white unions proves the wisdom of this step. Again, as may be expected, some Colonies forbid unions in certain trades and crafts, mainly farming, domestic and civil services.

Government labour services have advanced but the inspectorate is still inadequate. The authors advise in particular the appointment of men from the local population and from British trade unions as labour officers, and this is now being done. Recruits from local areas could take courses of study in Great Britain and tour certain countries to broaden their outlook.

Progress of late years is also to be seen in industrial conciliation and the fixing of minimum wages. The strikes of the nineteen-thirties proved the

necessity of peaceful settlement of labour disputes. The usual form of conciliation is through an arbitration tribunal or a board of enquiry, the reports of neither of which are legally binding but merely influence public opinion. It is not possible to say how well this procedure works. Certainly such machinery requires organised workers to state their case, and trade unionism is in its infancy in the Colonies, especially in Africa where two-thirds (60 million) of the Colonial peoples live. Protection can otherwise be afforded by wage fixation. Here the position cannot be said to be satisfactory. Of the forty Colonies with the necessary legislation, only nine have actually fixed wages.

Penal sanctions are naturally condemned by this report. While there may have been some justification for them when the Colonial worker was in a primitive stage, a migrant, a man of straw, who, having no trade union to help him, would find redress for grievances in desertion, to-day no such justification can be pleaded. It is true that penal sanctions are being gradually abolished; but this, says the Committee, is not enough. They should be done away with entirely as the grounds for their existence have gone. Further, in virtue of its vote in favour of abolition at the International Labour Conference in 1939, Britain is committed to this step.

The Committee also deals with the history of Colonial conventions, showing a gradual retreat from the more odious forms of forced labour, and the emergence of a new attitude more difficult to criticize, namely, forcing the Colonial Native to work for his own ultimate benefit on, for instance, anti-erosion and health schemes.

The report is a quiet and unspectacular attempt to portray conditions in some of the least-known parts of the world. Some of the recommendations may be impossible of fulfilment, bearing in mind Mr. Churchill's refusal "to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." In the main, however, the Committee faces conditions as they are, and does not envisage the sudden birth of a Utopia. It is this spirit of understanding criticism that makes valuable so many of the publications of the Fabian Society. E.K.

A Health Survey of African Children in Alexandra Township. By HARDING LE RICHE. 1943. Johannesburg: *Witwatersrand University Press*. 1s. 6d.

This is the record of an investigation into the health of 3,510 children attending four schools in the Township of Alexandra, near Johannesburg. It was carried out by a large group of medical students working in connection with the University Clinic at Alexandra, difficult cases being referred to a panel of consultant physicians.

A concise introductory statement explains the position of the people who live in this large township. As Alexandra is one of the few places where Africans can own houses, there has been much competition for sites and very high prices have been paid. It has been a struggle, wages being what they are, to find the further money for house building, and many houses are mortgaged. Naturally people who have made such efforts are among the better class of Non-Europeans, men with settled work in Johannesburg. The crowding that has taken place is due largely to overflow from the overcrowded slums of the city, but partly also to the owners of plots finding it necessary to raise money by letting part of their premises.

The township is administered by a committee of six, three (Europeans) including the chairman being nominated by the Administrator of the Transvaal and three (one European, one Coloured and one African) elected by the standholders (African and Coloured). The almost universal poverty of the people has limited severely the power of the committee to carry out improvements. The committee seems to have concentrated upon restricting overcrowding and upon sanitation, and for a town of some fifty thousand inhabitants there is remarkably little infectious disease. The Health Centre of the American Mission employs fully qualified African nurses as visiting nurses and the more recently established clinic of the Witwatersrand University, using the Health Centre as its base, gives valuable service, while affording the senior students opportunities for gaining clinical experience.

This investigation is an example of co-operation among students of different races, African and

Indian as well as European. On the whole the health conditions brought to light, though far from good, are better than might have been anticipated, better probably than would be found in most urban locations. Broadly, 40 per cent of the children were found to be healthy; 50 per cent had something or other wrong, in many cases from malnutrition; 10 per cent were ill enough to go to hospital. The blood reactions to the syphilis test were interesting, less than 13 per cent being positive. Samples taken in 1938-9 from nine urban and rural areas gave an average of 23 per cent of positives.

The investigators deserve credit for a very thorough piece of work. N.M.

The Bantu in South African Life. By SENATOR EDGAR H. BROOKES. 1943. Johannesburg: *S.A. Institute of Race Relations*. 60 pp. 1s.

This is a booklet of exceptional value. At the end of it Dr. Brookes says that the aim throughout has been "to survey the facts as they are to see what steps forward ought to be taken in the next five or ten years." Those of us who have been privileged to form some estimate of Dr. Brookes' mind appreciate his objectivity, his cool judgment and sanity. This does not mean that he lacks passion, but he has far too good a head to let his heart run away with it.

The book is packed full with wisdom in its necessarily brief treatment of 23 chapters on the main subjects of interest in South Africa with regard to the Bantu—wages, housing, problems of the reserves, taxation, education, careers, the human factor, and others. The booklet is well suited for study circle work, not only because it points to more advanced books dealing more fully with special subjects, but because the chapters have questions appended to them, to guide discussion.

There is no space in this short review to enlarge upon the many matters of vital interest that the Senator deals with. It must suffice to say that it is just about as good a conspectus, a general view of the situation as one could possibly have in small compass. A. J. HAILE.

Zoeloe-Leerboek. By J. A. ENGELBRECHT.
1943. Johannesburg: *Transvaler-Boekhandel*,
99 bl. 5s.

Professor Engelbrecht has written a most useful class book for Afrikaans students of Zulu. It is so arranged that a teacher is needed to supplement by explanation the skeleton of grammar given: the author did not design the book for self-study. Exercises are given throughout and are well graded, good idiomatic Zulu being given. Interspersed are sections of longer reading material of anthropological interest, for the provision of which the author acknowledges indebtedness to A. C. Myburgh's book, now, we understand, in the press. Throughout the exercises and in the earlier reading lessons a disjunctive method of word-division has been used which the author thinks advisable for beginners. Full conjunctive orthography is used in all the later reading material. We think this a mistake. Our experience is that European students of Zulu can appreciate the conjunctive system from the very start and

that obviates any need of unlearning later on.

There are a lot of very useful ideas throughout this book. To instance only a few: the differentiation of the various types of verb-perfect; the treatment of the adjectival concords in their predicative forms, before demonstration of their attributive forms; the introduction of the locative classes *pha-* and *ku-* (though inadequate explanation of the non-nounal character of these in Zulu to-day is given).

A few points might be taken into consideration by the author. It is doubtful whether it is correct to use the term "defective verb" for the auxiliaries *ka-* and *sa-*. On page 37, *ngisasendlini* should read *ngisesendlini*. On page 43 *isishiyangalombili* should read *isishiyagalombili*, similarly *isishiyagalolunye*. On page 49, I have heard the diminutive form of 1st person singular *ngonkana*, but not *ngonke*, as given here.

A rendering of this book into English might serve a very useful purpose.

C.M.D.

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- Serote, J. I. *Molato* (N. Sotho) 1943. 31 pp.

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